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Democracy is often equated with majority rule. But closer analysis
reveals that, in theory and by constitutional design, our criminal justice system
should be supermajoritarian, not majoritarian. The Constitution guarantees
that criminal punishment may be imposed only when backed by the
supermajoritarian-historically, unanimous-approval of a jury drawn from
the community. And criminal law theorists' expressive and retributive justifi-
cations for criminal punishment implicitly rely on the existence of broad com-
munity consensus in favor of imposing it. Despite these constitutional and
theoretical ideals, the criminal justice system today is majoritarian at best.
Both harsh and contested, it has lost the structural mechanisms that could en-
sure supermajoritarian support. By incorporating new supermajoritarian
checks and reinvigorating old ones, we could make criminal punishment con-
sonant with first principles and more responsive to community intuitions of justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The popular imagination often equates criminality with immoral-
ity.1 We ease our conscience when we lock people up because we as-
sume that lawbreakers are moral transgressors.2 Similarly, many
theorists justify criminal punishments, and distinguish them from civil
sanctions, on the ground that criminal punishments express collective
moral condemnation.3 This justification rests on the assumption that
the community, as a whole, supports the criminalization of the behav-
ior prohibited by law, as well as the method of its punishment.4 Within
our constitutional structure, the jury trial requirement serves to en-
force this link to the collective by guaranteeing that criminal punish-
ment is carried out only with the unanimous assent of a body
representative of the community.5
The primary contribution of this Article is that it articulates a
structural principle implicit in these theoretical and constitutional ide-
als: criminal punishment requires more than mere majority support.
Rather, a healthy, democratic criminal justice system should be
supermajoritarian. This insight helps to explain some of the shortcom-
1 See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when Formulating
Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 716 (2000) (explaining "people's assessment [of] the
behaviors prohibited by law [as] contrary to their moral values").
2 See Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psy-
chology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 255, 260 (2012) ("[A]s human beings we are nevertheless
naturally motivated to punish people we see as having a bad moral character or a lasting criminal
disposition.").
3 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 404-05 (1958) (explaining criminal penalty to attach to conduct that "incur[s] a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community").
4 See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive
Criminal Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 323 (1996) (citing EMILE DuIUHEIM, THE
DIVIsION OF LABOR IN SOcIETY 102 (George Simpson trans.) (1960)) ("There is no way to es-
cape the fact that, at a very basic level, the values of the community govern the content of the
criminal law: murder, rape and robbery are crimes because we, as a community, find these acts
reprehensible. Indeed, the criminal law would not exist were it not for the 'moral intuitions' of
society." (reviewing PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME
(1995))).
5 See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 396 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
402-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudica-
tion, and Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2017) ("From our nation's beginning,
a key aspect of the criminal jury trial was, and continues to be, the local community's role in
conveying punishment to criminal offenders.").
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ings of our modern criminal system and offers a new conceptualiza-
tion of how we might reform it.
In today's world, the narrative of community consensus is sus-
pect. Criminal punishment bears a far more complex relationship to
community judgment than the traditional justifications contemplate.
A legislature's criminalization of conduct may reflect not the commu-
nity's uniform view of the prohibited behavior's immorality, but
rather a narrowly won position staked out against a backdrop of con-
tested morality.6 Criminal laws already on the books may be vestiges
of a prior generation's moral sensibilities.7 At the same time, back end
protections against overenforcement of criminal laws are weak. The
jury trial, which once tethered criminal convictions to contemporary
community consent, is largely an historical relic.8
Enforcing a contested view of morality through criminal laws and
punishment presents particular problems of justice and legitimacy.
These problems are of growing importance at a time of increasing cul-
tural and political polarization in our country.9 In our fractured soci-
6 See Richard C. Fuller, Morals and the Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
624, 627 (1942) ("The notion that legislatures, in enacting new criminal legislation, are interven-
ing for the 'common good' or 'general welfare' cannot be reconciled with the harsh realism of
our politics. Such intervention is usually simply the result of effective pressure exerted by some
group with important political influence.").
7 See Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (2008).
8 See Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 1655, 1655 (2017) ("The
practical disappearance of the jury trial ranks among the most widely examined topics in Ameri-
can criminal justice.").
9 Our society today is not only pluralistic but also highly fractured along racial, religious,
and political lines. See, e.g., Bill Chappell, Census Finds a More Diverse America, as Whites Lag
Growth, NPR (June 22, 2017, 9:25 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/22/
533926978/census-fmds-a-more-diverse-america-as-whites-lag-growth [https://perma.cc/C7TY-
YL4S] ("America's diversity remains on the rise, with all racial and ethnic minorities growing
faster than whites from 2015 to 2016 .... ); ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL Cox, PUB. RELIGION
RES. INST., AMERICA'S CHANGING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY (2017), https://www.prri.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW5Q-HRSR] (describing
the drastic change in the American religious composition, including how white Christians occupy
less than half the public); Carroll Doherty, Key Takeaways on Americans' Growing Partisan
Divide over Political Values, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/10/05/takeaways-on-americans-growing-partisan-divide-over-political-values/ [https://
perma.cc/JJ2G-HMCC] (explaining how there is "little common ground" between the partisan
views of Democrats and Republicans); On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are
Worlds Apart, PEw RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/on-
views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-and-whites-are-worlds-apart/ [https://perma.cc/32UP-
CKKR] ("A new ... survey finds profound differences between black and white adults in their
views on racial discrimination, barriers to black progress and the prospects for change."); Nate
Cohn, Polarization is Dividing American Society, Not Just Politics, N.Y. TIMEs (June 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.comi/2014/06/12/upshot/polarization-is-dividing-american-society-not-just-
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ety, even criminal laws or punishment policies democratically enacted
by a majority of the jurisdiction's legislators may be sharply opposed
by a significant minority, or even a majority, of the populace.10 Other
politics.html [https://perma.cclDJ5U-D3SY] ("Liberals and conservatives prefer to associate
with and live near their fellow partisans ... [t]he result isn't just polarized politics, but a divided
society where liberals and conservatives increasingly keep apart.").
10 Recreational marijuana possession is a federal crime and legal in only nine states and
the District of Columbia. Marijuana Overview, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 28,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx [https://
perma.cc/EY7F-SQXP]. Yet a strong majority of Americans support legalization. Hannah Hartig
& Abigail Geiger, About Six-in-Ten Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEw RES. CTR.
(Oct. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/08/americans-support-marijuana-
legalization/ [https://perma.cc/MQM6-FGJD]. Criminalization is highly contested in other areas,
as well, including prostitution, possession of drugs other than marijuana, and euthanasia. Should
Prostitution Be Legalized?, MARIST POLL (May 31, 2016), http://maristpoll.marist.edul531-
should-prostitution-be-legalized/ [https://perma.cc/NBA3-PZ6Q] ("Nearly half of U.S. residents,
49% report prostitution between two consenting adults should be legal while 44% disagree.");
America's New Drug Policy Landscape, PEw RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape/ [https://perma.cc/K95Z-GAAC]
("67% of Americans say that the government should focus more on providing treatment for
those who use illegal drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Just 26% think the government's focus
should be on prosecuting users of such hard drugs."); Jade Wood & Justin McCarthy, Majority of
Americans Remain Supportive of Euthanasia, GALLUP (June 12, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/
poll/211928/majority-americans-remain-supportive-euthanasia.aspx [https://perma.cc/DNH3-
ZYHQ]. Punishment policies, in addition to substantive criminalization, are also contested-for
example, capital punishment, life without parole for juveniles ("LWOP"), and mandatory mini-
mum sentences. Edie Greene & Andrew J. Evelo, Attitudes Regarding Life Sentences for Juve-
nile Offenders, 37 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 276, 279 (2013) ("For seven of the eight crimes
evaluated-all except murder of a stranger-the percentage of respondents who gave a mini-
mum age for LWOP in the juvenile range failed to reach a majority (50%), indicating an overall
lack of support for imposing LWOP on juvenile offenders."); Christopher Ingraham, Americans
Overwhelmingly Agree It's Time to End Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, WASH. POST (Oct. 10,
2014) (reporting results of Pew Center poll finding that "63% of people say that states moving
away from the idea of mandatory prison sentences for non-violent offenses is a good thing"); J.
Baxter Oliphant, Public Support for the Death Penalty Ticks Up, PEw RES. CTR. (June 11, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/11/us-support-for-death-penalty-ticks-up-
2018 /
[https://perma.cclCE23-ZGAD] (reporting "54% of Americans favor the death penalty for peo-
ple convicted of murder, while 39% are opposed," up from a "four-decade low" of 49% who
favored capital punishment in 2016). Sometimes this split public sentiment is reflected in close
legislative votes. See, e.g., Tom Angell, Majority of Delaware Lawmakers Approve Marijuana
Legalization Bill, But It Fails, FORBEs, (June 27, 2018, 8:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
tomangell/2018/06/27/majority-of-delaware-lawmakers-approve-marijuana-legalization-bill-but-
it-fails/#7212ede315da [https://perma.ccl6G45-8UUQ]. At other times, legislative votes on crimi-
nal justice policies, even ones that eventually become highly contested, are overwhelmingly in
support of harsher punishment. For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
passed the Senate by a vote of 91-1. S. 1762, 98th Cong. (1984). Legislative disconnects with
popular opinion may be exacerbated by undemocratic dynamics within our system of representa-
tive government, such as gerrymandering, low voter turnout, voter suppression, and the influ-
ence of big money in politics. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 361, 363 (2008)
(reviewing political science literature identifying democratic deficits in elected government insti-
[Vol. 87:875878
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democratically enacted criminal laws may be tangential to the moral
intuitions of the majority." When the social meaning of particular be-
havior is in dispute, criminalization is a kind of coercive governmental
speech, weighing in on one side of the debate, backed up by vio-
lence.12 This is a precarious situation for the criminal law itself and for
the individuals who find themselves in its crosshairs.
Other scholars in recent years-most notably, Paul Robinson-
have focused on the theoretical problem of punishment that is out of
keeping with community perceptions of justice.'3 This Article consid-
ers similar problems and potential solutions from a different frame-
work: through the lens of how we structure our democratic
decisionmaking bodies, rather than by empirically gauging communal
morality.14 Specifically, this Article focuses on how a system that once
had significant supermajoritarian features has morphed into one that
is at best majoritarian."5 The loss of supermajoritarian support is a sig-
nificant problem facing the criminal law today, and the reincorpora-
tion of supermajoritarian principles would strengthen its legitimacy,
moral coherence, and constitutionality.16
Part I is normative. I argue that a well functioning, morally coher-
ent criminal justice system should have supermajoritarian-not
majoritarian-support for the punishments it imposes. I explain why a
supermajoritarian system of defining and enforcing criminal laws is
tutions); Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 115-16, 146-57
(2012).
11 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1395, 1411-17
(2002).
12 Cf Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610 (1986) (describ-
ing judicial interpretation as both "jurispathic"-in that it "kill[s] the diverse legal traditions that
compete with the State"-and "homicidal"-in that it ushers in and justifies the State's use of
violence).
13 E.g., Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1940, 2017,
2025-26 (2010) [hereinafter Robinson, The Disutility of Injustice]; Paul H. Robinson, The Ongo-
ing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089,
1107 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution]; Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson,
Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and
Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 218-19 (2012).
14 In a similar vein, Douglas Berman has explained the relevance of constitutional criminal
procedure to the questions of substantive criminal law policy raised by Robinson. Douglas A.
Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American "Revolution in Punishment Theory," 42 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1113, 1114 (2011).
15 In this Article, I use the term "majoritarian" or "bare majoritarian" to signify a system
that gives power to a simple majority of 51%.
16 In this way, I seek to meaningfully connect criminal procedures to substantive criminal
law goals. See Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic
Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 1677, 1679 (2017).
2019] 879
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
most consistent with constitutional principles, theoretical justifications
for punishment, and practical efficacy. Criminal convictions secured
without a robust community expression of approval are unmoored
from core constitutional communitarian protections. Moreover, signif-
icant moral dissensus weakens the theoretical justification for criminal
punishment. And a simple majoritarian system leaves space for large
swaths of the community to disagree with democratically-enacted
criminal laws, which may result in flouting of the law and undermining
the criminal law's perceived legitimacy.
Part II is descriptive. I detail the majoritarian-and sometimes
minoritarian-status quo of our modern criminal law system. Early
American criminal justice was marked by a discriminatory and mi-
noritarian conception of those eligible for civic participation, but pro-
vided strong supermajoritarian protections within that constrained
sphere.' Today, we have a broader understanding of the civic commu-
nity, but our federal and state legislative systems-and hence our sys-
tems for enacting criminal laws-largely function as majoritarian or
even minoritarian, despite some supermajoritarian features.18 The
protection of unanimous jury verdicts,19 which once played a critical
role in ensuring that criminal punishment conformed to the con-
science of the entire civic community, has all but disappeared.20 Nearly
all criminal convictions today are the result of a guilty plea rather than
a jury trial.21 Even those defendants who elect to exercise their right
to a jury trial are offered a weakened version of that original right.22
Juries were once charged with deciding the law as well as the facts.2 3
17 See infra Section II.A.
18 See infra Section II.B.
19 The common law demanded jury unanimity. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349-50 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1899). As discussed in
more depth infra Section I.A, whether the Constitution guarantees unanimous or merely
supermajoritarian jury trials is the subject of heated scholarly debate, although the Supreme
Court has permitted nonunanimous verdicts in state court proceedings. See Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 410-14 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-63 (1972). Today, only
Louisiana and Oregon allow convictions by nonunanimous verdicts. See LA. CONST. ANN. art. I,
§ 17 (2018); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 (2018).
20 See infra Sections II.A-.B.
21 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) ("Ninety-seven percent of federal convic-
tions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas."); Suja A.
Thomas, The Missing Branch of the Jury, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1262-63 (2016) (noting that
juries "try around 1%-4% of criminal cases in federal and state courts").
22 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 238 (2005).
23 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 903 (1994); see also infra note 60.
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Not so today.24 Without defying the judge's instructions by exercising
their power of nullification,2 5 juries today cannot express their disa-
greement with the morality of the law itself.
Beyond the jury, the Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments"26 could conceivably place limitations on the
crimes and punishments established by majoritarian legislatures. Yet
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-particularly
when reviewing prison sentences for adult offenders-has been ex-
traordinarily deferential to majoritarian legislatures, earning scholarly
criticism for failing to serve a meaningful countermajoritarian
function.
Part III suggests mechanisms to revive supermajoritarianism in
the prospective development of the criminal law and in the retrospec-
tive interpretation of constitutional protections pertaining to the crim-
inal law. Reforms to the jury itself could strengthen its normative role
and representativeness of the community.27 Legislatures could require
a supermajority of their members to vote in favor of new criminal laws
or to strengthen the penalties for existing criminal laws.28 Recognizing
the supermajoritarian function lost with the demise of the jury trial,
we might establish other mechanisms for unanimous or
supermajoritarian citizen review at various stages of the criminal jus-
tice process.29 Judicial doctrine could incorporate supermajoritarian
principles as well.30 When inquiring into "evolving standards of de-
cency" in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, rather than binding
itself to the punitive will of the majority, the Supreme Court could
carefully scrutinize criminal justice practices that are condemned by a
substantial minority of the population. With these and other reforms,
it may be possible to rein in criminal punishments that are out of step
24 See Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895); AMAR, supra note 22, at 238.
25 Jury nullification today is a power but not a right, and juries who exercise that power
disobey explicit judicial instructions against it. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606,
615-17 (2d Cir. 1997); Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury's Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV.
189, 205 (2015). A Ninth Circuit panel, however, recently held that the power to instruct against
nullification has limits. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Al-
though a court has 'the duty to forestall or prevent [nullification],' including 'by firm instruction
or admonition,' a court should not state or imply that (1) jurors could be punished for jury
nullification, or that (2) an acquittal resulting from jury nullification is invalid." (citation
omitted)).
26 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
27 See infra Section III.A.
28 See infra Section III.B.
29 See infra Section III.C.
30 See infra Section III.D.
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with community sensibilities but carried out and justified in the com-
munity's name.
I. SUPERMAJORITARIAN VIRTUES
In this Section, I consider why supermajoritarian decisionmaking
is valuable in the criminal context. I begin with the Constitution, and I
argue that the Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights en-
shrined a supermajoritarian ethic into the American criminal justice
system through the institution of the jury.
31 I then summarize some of
the theoretical justifications for punishment outside the Constitution
and conclude that a criminal justice system buttressed by
supermajoritarian support has advantages in terms of moral coher-
ence, legitimacy, and adherence.32
A. Constitutional Design
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have notably argued that
the American constitutional structure is predominantly
supermajoritarian rather than majoritarian.
33 They contend that the
American innovation34 of supermajoritarian rules of governance was
designed to preserve popular rule while also protecting against the
tyranny of the majority-a fundamental concern of framers such as
James Madison.35 McGinnis and Rappaport identify supermajoritarian
dynamics in the Constitution not only in its explicitly
supermajoritarian requirements,36 but also in those provisions gov-
erning ordinary legislation (as bicameralism and the presidential veto
power also effectively require supermajoritarian support)
37 and in the
"absolute" constitutional prohibitions set forth in the Bill of Rights
31 See infra Section I.A.
32 See infra Section I.B.
33 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80
TEx. L. REv. 703, 705 (2002).
34 See id. at 722 ("The introduction of super-majority rules thus represents one of the
distinctive contributions of the United States to the science of constitutionalism.").
35 Id. at 707 ("Supermajority rules are ubiquitous in the Constitution because they are well
designed to advance the ultimate purpose of that document: to establish a well-functioning re-
public. As Madison explained in The Federalist No. 10, his most important discussion of republi-
can government, the 'great object to which our inquiries are directed' is 'to secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of a [majority] faction, and at the same time to pre-
serve the spirit and form of popular government.' Supermajority rules are, of course, a means of
achieving this result, since they both restrain majority factions and retain popular decisionmak-
ing by legislative assemblies." (footnote omitted)).
36 Id. at 711-12 (identifying and explaining the significance of "seven express
supermajority rules in the original Constitution").
37 Id. at 712-16.
[Vol. 87:875882
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(which can be amended through the supermajoritarian procedures set
forth in Article V).38
Surprisingly, McGinnis and Rappaport do not mention the jury as
one of the core supermajoritarian requirements of the Constitution.39
In a separate work, McGinnis himself casually mentions the jury as a
majoritarian institution.40 He is not alone; historical luminaries includ-
ing Alexis de Tocqueville and others have characterized and cele-
brated the jury as a great guarantor of majority rule.4 1 Yet the
institution of the jury at the time of the founding operated with a
super-supermajority rule: the requirement of unanimity.42 To be sure,
the Constitution's criminal jury clauses do not specify a voting rule.4 3
But it is quite clear that at common law the term "jury" was under-
stood as a "unanimous jury,"44 and it was celebrated as such by the
likes of Blackstone.45 If we recognize that the Constitution's framers
wove together majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions with in-
tentionality in order to achieve democratic objectives, and that they
viewed supermajoritarian institutions as a simultaneous embodiment
of and check on the will of the people,46 then the supermajoritarianism
38 Id. at 716.
39 See generally id. (omitting mention of jury as a core supermajoritarian constitutional
requirement).
40 John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurispru-
dence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 485, 560-61 (2002) ("Second, while the jury is a
popular, even populist, institution, it does not typically face the process defects such as the lever-
age of special interests and the rational apathy of citizens that beset centralized democracy.").
41 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1185
(1991) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94 (Vintage Books
ed. 1945)) ("As Tocqueville observed, the overall jury system was fundamentally populist and
majoritarian: ' . . . The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as direct
and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage. They are
two instruments of equal power, which contribute to the supremacy of the majority.').
42 See Gary J. Jacobsohn, Commentary, The Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury
Trial, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 40 ("By the end of the eighteenth century, the rule of unanimity
had become well established.").
43 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amend. VI; see also Jacobsohn, supra note 42, at 40 ("Like
much of the common law, however, the Americans incorporated the unanimous jury into their
criminal justice system without adopting a constitutional provision requiring its use.").
44 E.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-08 n.3 (1972) (despite ruling that unani-
mous jury verdicts were not constitutionally required, recognizing the prevalence of the practice
at common law and in eighteenth century America).
45 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 349-50 ("[T]he founders of the English law have,
with excellent forecast, contrived that ... the truth of every accusation ... should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently cho-
sen and superior to all suspicion."); see also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 408 n.3 (describing common
law history).
46 See supra note 35.
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of the jury was an integral part of their design of a fair criminal justice
system.
The jury4 7 is the centerpiece of the constitutional regulation of
criminal punishment. The jury trial is both an individual right of the
accused48 and a structural institution of popular self-governance, codi-
fied in Article 1149 and described by some as a "fourth branch" of
government.50 It is the only guarantee that is enshrined both in the
Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights.51 The jury requirement
was of paramount importance to the framers; Akhil Amar has de-
scribed the jury as the "paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of
Rights" and has argued that the jury trial right informs and is infused
throughout the Bill of Rights, not just the provisions that explicitly
mention it.52
Many have extolled the jury guarantee as a popular, communitar-
ian protection against government overreaching.53 But it was more.
The jury requirement was a promise that, before anyone could be con-
victed of a crime,54 a unanimous jury drawn from the community had
47 As I will discuss later in this Section, modern Supreme Court precedent recognizes the
jury's historical pedigree as a unanimous institution but permits supermajoritarian 12-person
juries in state court. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text. Until I reach a discussion of
that precedent, I will discuss the jury as a unanimous institution, because that is clearly the
institution the Founders would have recognized. I will then also discuss whether the Apodaca v.
Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana decisions limit my theory in any meaningful way. 406 U.S. 404
(1972); 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
48 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law .... ). Note
that the Fifth Amendment also provides for the protection of a grand jury in criminal cases, but I
do not focus on that provision here, since the grand jury was not a unanimous institution.
49 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.").
50 See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury's Second Coming, 100 GEo. L.J. 657, 699 (2012);
Dan T. Coenen, Institutional Arrangements and Individual Rights: A Comment on Professor
Tribe's Critique of the Modern Court's Treatment of Constitutional Liberty, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
1159, 1191; Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REV.
1367, 1392 (2017).
51 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 870.
52 See Amar, supra note 41, at 1190-91; Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Sug-
gested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1169-70 (1995).
53 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) and Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)); Witherspoon v. Bi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968); STEPHANos BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
114 (2012); Appleman, supra note 5, at 1415.
54 Of course, at the time of the founding the Sixth Amendment only applied against the
federal government and thus did not restrict state jury practice. However, all state constitutions
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to reach a guilty verdict, thus assuring-at least symbolically, and
often in reality-that the community as a whole, and not merely a
faction or mere majority of the community, would deem the individual
guilty and deserving of punishment.5 5 As a unanimous institution, the
jury is structurally different than a legislature.56 Critiques of jury una-
nimity as undemocratic57 thus miss a critical point: in the context of
criminal punishment, bare majority approval is not sufficient to sub-
ject the accused to the coercive power of the state. Community con-
sensus is more appropriate. Punishment supported only by a majority
faction would have been deeply concerning to the Founders .5  The
unanimous jury, by contrast, simultaneously "link[s] law with contem-
porary society" and "combat[s]" the effects of "community passion
and prejudice." 5 9
The unanimous founding-era jury, significantly, had a vast power
to find both fact and law,60 thus serving as a potent communitarian
check against government overreaching.61 Juries could determine not
had similar protections. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 870 ("Twelve states had enacted
written constitutions prior to the Constitutional Convention, and the only right that these twelve
constitutions declared unanimously was the right of a criminal defendant to jury trial.").
55 Below I will discuss in much more detail how the reality of the jury requirement, rather
than its conceptual ideal, did not adequately capture community will because women, minorities,
and those without property were barred from service. See infra Section II.A.
56 See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of
the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOzo L. REv. 1417, 1422-23 (1997).
57 See id. at 1420 (describing the critique of the unanimity rule as anti-democratic).
58 See supra note 37.
59 Justice Stewart, dissenting in Johnson, described the unanimous jury's dual function of
linking criminal justice to the community while simultaneously protecting against the unbridled
passions of the majority, though without explicitly noting the tension between those roles and
the utility of a unanimity requirement in achieving them both. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 399 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The requirement that the verdict of the jury be unani-
mous, surely as important as these other constitutional requisites, preserves the jury's function in
linking law with contemporary society. It provides the simple and effective method endorsed by
centuries of experience and history to combat the injuries to the fair administration of justice
that can be inflicted by community passion and prejudice.").
60 See Chapman, supra note 25, at 215 ("[T]here is a great deal of evidence that judges and
politicians well into the early national era agreed that the criminal jury had the right, as well as
the power, to decide questions of law."); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-
Qualification, 59 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 87, 87 (2008) ("The Framers understood criminal petit
juries to be responsible for making determinations of both fact and law. This 'jury review' power
provided the people with a 'check' against the government's judicial function."); Alschuler &
Deiss, supra note 23, at 903 ("In England, although juries may have often disregarded the in-
structions of judges, they never acquired de jure authority to do so. In America following the
Revolution, however, the authority of juries to resolve legal issues was frequently confirmed by
constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions.").
61 See Chris Kemmitt, Function over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's Historical Role as
a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 110-11 (2006).
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only whether a criminal defendant was factually guilty of the offense
at issue, but also whether it was morally or constitutionally excessive
to impose a particular punishment. It is well established in scholarly
literature that juries had a right to acquit against the evidence,62 and
that juries did actively exercise this right, particularly at times of com-
munity disagreement with harsh punishment practices.63
Thus, the Constitution creates a supermajoritarian structure for
imposing criminal punishment. The jury-a powerful political institu-
tion designed to represent the interests of the entire community-en-
forces supermajoritarian limits on criminal punishment and connects
criminal law to the views of the community as a whole.64 Although
many commentators recognize the significance of the jury as a bul-
wark against corrupt or overzealous state action and celebrate the jury
as a critical link between the community and the criminal justice sys-
tem,6 5 fewer focus on this distinctly supermajoritarian function of en-
suring not only bare majority support, but also collective, near-
consensus-based acceptance of criminal punishment.
Two important nuances qualify my claim that the jury represents
a constitutional commitment to criminal justice supermajoritarianism.
First, there is a question about whether unanimity of criminal petit
juries is constitutionally required. In Apodaca v. Oregon6 6 and John-
62 AMAR, supra note 22, at 241; Chapman, supra note 25, at 205; Amar, supra note 41, at
1185.
63 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 90-91 (2003) ("Opposition to capital punish-
ment for property crime thus originated in a changing morality of retribution. Death, many be-
lieved, was simply too harsh a punishment for theft. This moral sentiment quickly acquired
urgent practical implications, because as belief in the disproportion of death for property crime
grew, so did the difficulty of obtaining convictions. The propensity of juries to acquit defendants
of property crimes rather than send them to their deaths began to be perceived as a serious
problem in the 1760s."); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitu-
tional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 51-59 (2003) (describing a
robust history of jury nullification in the eighteenth century); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as
Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REv. 311, 321 (2003) ("In the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, jurors frequently used their power to determine legal matters as a way of challenging or
nullifying unjust legislation.").
64 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) ("[O]ne of the most important
functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contem-
porary community values and the penal system .... ); see BIBAS, supra note 53, at 114.
65 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968) and Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
519 n.15; BIBAS, supra note 53, at 114; Appleman, supra note 5, at 1415; Carroll, supra note 50, at
687; Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 998-99 (2003); Kem-
mitt, supra note 61, at 110-11.
66 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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son v. Louisiana,67 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment
did not mandate unanimous jury verdicts in state courts, although it
preserved the constitutional requirement of unanimous jury verdicts
in federal courts.68 The plurality opinion in Apodaca acknowledged
that unanimity was the dominant practice at common law, dating back
to the Middle Ages.69 But, in its view, whether the unanimity require-
ment was constitutionalized at the founding was a closer question.
During the drafting of the Sixth Amendment, Madison proposed lan-
guage that would have, among other things, explicitly preserved the
right to a unanimous jury,70 but this language was ultimately replaced
with the less specific text we have today.71 The drafting history leaves
open two plausible interpretations: either the specific reference was
omitted as unnecessary because it was already self-evident that a jury
would be unanimous, or it was omitted in order to narrow (or permit
future generations to narrow) the substantive scope of the right.72 A
majority of the Court decided in favor of the latter interpretation.7 3
Other Justices took a sharply divergent view of the history,74 as well as
of the constitutive significance of unanimity to the jury trial right,75
67 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
68 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring in No. 69-5035 and concurring in the
judgment in No. 69-5046) (agreeing with "an unbroken line of [Supreme Court] cases reaching
back into the late 1800's . . . that unanimity is one of the indispensable features of federal jury
trial" but disagreeing that the unanimity requirement is so fundamental as to be incorporated
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining the inconsistent approaches in state and federal court); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411.
69 See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08 ("[Tlhe requirement of unanimity arose during the
Middle Ages and had become an accepted feature of the common-law jury by the 18th century."
(footnote omitted)).
70 Madison proposed language that required trial "by an impartial jury of freeholders of
the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other
accustomed requisites." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); Apodaca, 406
U.S. at 409.
71 The Sixth Amendment secures the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409.
72 See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409-10.
73 Id. at 409-10; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96-97 (1970).
74 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 370-71 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in No. 69-5035
and concurring in the judgment in No. 69-5046) (concluding that "in accord both with history
and precedent, that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict in a
federal criminal trial"); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 124 n.9 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting
in No. 188 and concurring in the result in No. 927) (disputing the Williams Court's historical and
textual analysis and arguing that the Sixth Amendment was more likely predicated on "the as-
sumption that the most prominent features of the jury would be preserved as a matter of
course").
75 See, e.g., Johnson, 406 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 402-03 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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and both the accuracy and the advisability of the Court's approach are
certainly open to debate.7 6
For purposes of my thesis here, however, it is important to note
that, despite rejecting a constitutional unanimity requirement for the
states, the Apodaca Court implicitly relied on the challenged jury ver-
dicts' supermajority voting rules in upholding them. Justice White's
plurality opinion in Apodaca concluded that a supermajoritarian jury
of 10-2 or 11-1 still served the jury's intended structural function to
"interpos[e] between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen."77 Justice Blackmun, the swing Justice
who provided the fifth vote in both Apodaca and Johnson, made clear
that the preservation of a supermajority voting rule of at least 75% in
each case, which required that "a substantial majority of the jury" be
convinced of guilt, was critical to his decision.78 Moreover, the Su-
76 Scholars have debated the relative effectiveness and desirability of unanimous and
supermajoritarian juries. A number of interesting empirical studies have shed light on the practi-
cal effects of different voting rules for juries. See, e.g., Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Con-
formity, Coercion, and the Protection of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569,
579-80 (2007) (surveying psychological literature about jury deliberations with unanimous and
nonunanimous voting rules and noting advantages to the quality of deliberations with unani-
mous rules); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARv. L. REV.
1261, 1272-76 (2000) (surveying social science literature and concluding that "[a] shift to major-
ity rule appears to alter both the quality of the deliberative process and the accuracy of the jury's
judgment. In the end, the data indicates that unanimity assures viewpoint diversity better than
majority rule."). Some scholars support the notion of a supermajority voting rule for juries as a
theoretical matter. Michael H. Glasser, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Ver-
dicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659 (1997); Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism
and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 196 (2006) (arguing that the
constitutional and legislative systems are supermajoritarian and that jury verdicts should be
supermajoritarian too). Akhil Amar, who acknowledges the historical unanimity requirement,
suggests reforming the jury to allow for supermajority or majority vote to cabin the ramifications
of his other proposed reforms. Amar, supra note 52, at 1190. Other scholars and judges, includ-
ing the dissenters in Apodoca and Johnson, have been sharply critical of doing away with the
unanimity requirement. E.g., Johnson, 406 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 402-03
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon
Should Be Easy: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of
Our Justice System, 95 OR. L. REV. 1 (2016); Kate Riordan, Ten Angry Men: Unanimous Jury
Verdicts in Criminal Trials and Incorporation After McDonald, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1403 (2011).
77 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410-11 ("In terms of this function we perceive no difference be-
tween juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10
to two or 11 to one . . . in either case, the interest of the defendant in having the judgment of his
peers interposed between himself and the officers of the State who prosecute and judge him is
equally well served." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
78 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I do not hesitate to say, either,
that a system employing a 7-5 standard, rather than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me
great difficulty. As MR. JUSTICE WHITE points out. . . 'a substantial majority of the jury' are
to be convinced. That is all that is before us in each of these cases.").
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preme Court, while permitting six-person juries,79 has also held that
such juries must be unanimous.s0 Thus, current Supreme Court doc-
trine approves nonunanimous juries in state (but not federal) court,
but only so long as they are of sufficient size and reach a decision by a
sufficient supermajority margin.
Does it matter to my claim whether the Constitution guarantees a
unanimous or merely supermajoritarian jury? Certainly, jury unanim-
ity would enhance the jury's structural impact as a supermajoritarian
check. Given the small sample size of the jury, unanimity would do
more to ensure community agreement behind a decision to convict. In
particular, a unanimity requirement may ensure that minority voices
are not drowned out by the majority-that the jury is effectively
supermajoritarian and reflective of a greater degree of community
consensus rather than merely majoritarian.81 On the other hand, some
scholars have voiced concern that a unanimous jury requirement sty-
mies respect for dissenting viewpoints because of pressure on holdout
jurors to conform to majority views.8 At bottom, however, whether
unanimous or not, the jury remains indisputably supermajoritarian.
And its centrality to the constitutional design stands for the constitu-
tional principle that punishment should not be imposed unless en-
dorsed by "the community" at large.
The second qualification is that, at the time of the founding, any
so-called "supermajoritarian" institution, including the jury, defined
supermajority support only in reference to those entitled to partici-
pate in democratic governance-which excluded groups such as wo-
men and enslaved African Americans. Thus, while early American
juries were unanimous, they were not truly representative of the en-
79 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (upholding six-person nonpetty juries);
see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (invalidating five-person nonpetty juries).
80 Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979).
81 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[C]ommunity confidence in the
administration of criminal justice cannot but be corroded under a system in which a defendant
who is conspicuously identified with a particular group can be acquitted or convicted by a jury
split along group lines."); id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When verdicts must be unani-
mous, no member of the jury may be ignored by the others. When less than unanimity is suffi-
cient, consideration of minority views may become nothing more than a matter of majority
grace. In my opinion, the right of all groups in this Nation to participate in the criminal process
means the right to have their voices heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that right. Majority
verdicts could destroy it."); see also, e.g., Taylor-Thompson, supra note 76, at 1264 (explaining
how "nonunanimity threatens to eliminate the voices of those who have only recently secured
the right to participate in the democratic process").
82 See Emil J. Bove III, Note, Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in
Anti-Deadlock Instructions, 97 GEO. L.J. 251, 264 (2008).
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tire community.83 In fact, the post-Civil War history of the American
jury shows just how resistant some states would be to transforming the
jury into a genuinely supermajoritarian institution. Significantly, it was
only after Reconstruction, when the southern states were required to
permit African Americans to serve on juries, that Louisiana moved to
nonunanimous juries, with the apparent aim of reducing or eliminat-
ing the effects of dissent from black jurors. As scholars have noted,
the nonunanimous jury "was first adopted in Louisiana at a Constitu-
tional Convention expressly convened 'to establish the supremacy of
the white race.' "
Undeniably, the discriminatory demographic composition of the
founding-era jury undermines its historical pedigree as a
supermajoritarian institution. Yet the same could be said of any of the
founding institutions that paired supermajoritarianism with exclusion-
ary conceptions of citizenship and civic participation-including the
Constitution itself, which was ratified without the political consent of
women or minorities.85 If we understand the founding principles of the
Constitution to include supermajoritarianism, then the jury is just as
much, if not more, deserving of that conceptual title than other institu-
tions created within the constitutional structure.
Moreover, the bitter struggle fought after Reconstruction to ex-
clude African Americans from service on juries86 showed just how sig-
nificant the supermajoritarian power of the jury was when applied in
an egalitarian fashion. Although there was also fierce opposition by
white southerners to African Americans voting in majoritarian legisla-
tures,87 the supermajoritarian structure of the jury gave dissenting mi-
nority members a particularly potent power to affect outcomes.88 The
structural reality drove some states to change the jury's historical vot-
83 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 884.
84 Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1597 (2018) (cit-
ing Thomas Semmes, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Address at the Louisiana Constitu-
tional Convention of 1898, in OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: HELD IN NEW ORLEANS, TUEs-
DAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1898, at 374 (1898)); Robert J. Smith & Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race
Continues to Influence the Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REv. 361,
374 (2012).
85 See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Consti-
tution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1987).
86 See Smith & Sarma, supra note 84, at 375-76.
87 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-41 (1993) (describing protracted history of white resis-
tance to and suppression of African American voting beginning after ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
88 Smith & Sarma, supra note 84, at 375 (describing the white southern fear that freed
slaves would be able to "hijack[] sentencing outcomes").
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ing rule and move away from unanimity specifically in order to over-
come its inherently supermajoritarian effect.8 9
Thus, the primary mechanism in the Constitution for ensuring
fairness in the criminal justice system was also structurally designed to
ensure supermajority community support for the imposition of pun-
ishment: in other words, a constitutional commitment to a
supermajoritarian criminal justice system.
B. Morality, Legitimacy, and Compliance
As described above, the voice of the community as a whole finds
constitutional expression in the institution of the criminal jury. Similar
communitarian echoes can be found in the literature on the theory of
punishment, most particularly within expressive theories of criminal
law. It is commonly, though not universally, accepted that a primary
function of the criminal law is to express-and enforce-society's nor-
mative values.0 Relatedly, some theorists justify punishment as serv-
ing the important function of making the community whole again
after it has been harmed by a lawbreaker. Both of these ideas depend
upon a conception of community consensus about both impermissible
harm and permissible punishment. Yet many theorists spend little to
no time quantifying what they mean by "community" or "society."91
What amount of agreement must there be in order to realize these
expressive and cohesive goals? Are there ways to structure the crimi-
nal justice system to maximize the possibility that criminal punishment
actually-not just theoretically-represents the voice of the
community?
My goal in this Section is not to present my own theory of crimi-
nal punishment, but rather to show that community intuitions about
justice and morality frequently arise as a foundation of the theoretical
discussion of punishment. From there, I argue that if we take as a
starting point that community consensus matters in justifying punish-
ment, then we ought to structure our criminal justice institutions with
intentionality so as to try to capture that consensus. I conclude that
supermajoritarian decisionmaking rules would mesh well with expres-
sive theories of punishment and would enhance the responsiveness
and utility of the criminal law, particularly in a pluralistic society in
89 Id.
90 E.g., Hart, supra note 3, at 404-05; Slobogin, supra note 4, at 323.
91 One exception is Robert Weisberg, who honed in on the worrisome amorphousness of
the term. Robert Weisberg, Restorative lustice and the Danger of "Community," 2003 UTAH L.
REv. 343, 343.
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which it is difficult for the community to speak with a unified voice or
to share a unified understanding of criminal justice.
The definition of criminal punishment is slippery, especially in the
modem age when we have an expansive regulatory state and signifi-
cant blurring of the lines between civil and criminal law.92 A common
definition in the face of this uncertainty is that criminal punishment is
defined as the expression of the collective denunciation of the com-
munity at large.9 3 This expressive definition has been advanced by le-
gal philosophers ranging from Emile Durkheim94 and James Fitzjames
Stephen9 5 in the nineteenth century to modem theorists such as Joel
Feinberg96 and Dan Kahan.Y
Whether the descriptive attribute of community condemnation
justifies criminal punishment is a stickier question. Durkheim's answer
appears to be yes: to Durkheim, the function and value of criminal
punishment is to restore and reinforce society's solidarity.98 Others,
such as H.L.A. Hart, have critiqued the justification of punishment as
92 In recent years, the Supreme Court has been faced with a number of cases in which it
had to decide whether intrusive "civil" consequences were in fact "criminal." See, e.g., Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003) (concluding that requirements under the Alaska Sex Offender Re-
gistration Act were civil rather than criminal); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)
(holding that involuntary confinement under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was civil
rather than criminal); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 365 (1986) (concluding that "proceedings
under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act" were civil rather than criminal).
93 Although there is no consensus that expressive theories justify punishment, there is a
widely shared perception that expressive theories describe aspects of punishment. That is, to
understand why and how we punish, we can consider punishment to be a community's act of
responsive violence, expressing a message to a variety of audiences. There is also a somewhat
less widely shared concern that expressive theories relate to some pathological tendencies of
criminal law. John Steele, A Seal Pressed in the Hot Wax of Vengeance: A Girardian Understand-
ing of Expressive Punishment, 16 J.L. & RELIG. 35, 40 (2001).
94 See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 80 ("[A]n act is criminal when it offends strong and
defined states of the collective conscience."); see also id. at 73 ("[T]he only common characteris-
tic of all crimes is that they consist-except some apparent exceptions with which we shall deal
later-in acts universally disapproved of by members of each society.... [T]he reality of the fact
that we have just established is not contestable; that is, that crime shocks sentiments which, for a
given social system, are found in all healthy consciences.").
95 See 2 JAMES FITZJAMEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (Criminal "law gives definite expression and a solemn ratifica-
tion ... to the hatred which is excited by the commission of the offence . . . .").
96 See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397 (1965),
reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95 (Princeton Univ. Press 1970).
97 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
594-95 (1996).
98 See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 103 ("[S]ince it is the common conscience which is
attacked, it must be that which resists, and accordingly the resistance must be collective. ... The
very great intensity and the very definite nature of the sentiments which punishment properly so
called avenges, clearly accounts for this more perfect unification.").
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an expression of societal morals. To Hart, the harm principle, rather
than community's moral intuitions, should be paramount in justifying
punishment.99 And certainly, critics of the justificatory expressive the-
ory abound; many moral philosophers, in particular, prefer to focus on
moral reasoning rather than communitarian preferences.100 Yet other
modem scholars have gravitated toward the community's expression
of a cohesive moral vision as a justifying force for punishment. Jean
Hampton has understood and justified punishment as the commu-
nity's expression of the victim's moral worth, supplanting the devalua-
tion inflicted by the criminal.101 In a compelling recent article, Joshua
Kleinfeld put forth a theory of criminal punishment that he calls
"reconstructivism," which at its core,
sees criminal law as the defender of a shared moral culture
that is important in substantial part because it is shared,
rather than solely because it is right (though many within the
tradition would stress that it is more likely to be right, and
certainly more likely to be functional, in virtue of winning a
community's assent over time).1o2
Kleinfeld identifies the "pathology" of contemporary mass incarcera-
tion as its alienating force: its destruction of the solidarity that forms
the heart of the criminal law's function.103
99 Kahan, supra note 97, at 596 (citing H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY
65-66 (1963)) ("In his famous rejoinder to Lord Devlin, who had used the expressive theory to
criticize proposals to decriminalize homosexuality, H.L.A. Hart assailed this justification for
punishment as 'belong[ing] to the prehistory of morality.' 'The idea that we may punish offend-
ers against a moral code, not to prevent harm or suffering or even the repetition of the offence
but simply as a means of venting or emphatically expressing moral condemnation, is uncomforta-
bly close to human sacrifice as an expression of religious worship."' (footnotes omitted)).
100 See, e.g., Zachary R. Calo, Empirical Desert and the Moral Economy of Punishment, 42
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1123, 1124 (2011) (quoting Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in
the Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831,
1834 (2007)) ("Deontological desert is distinguished from other forms of desert in that 'it can
provide a foundation for desert that transcends any particular case, community, or culture."');
Mary Sigler, The Methodology of Desert, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1173, 1174 (2011) (defending moral
philosophy rather than community sentiment as the justifiable basis for substantive criminal
law).
101 Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRIT-
ics 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
102 Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1492-93 (2016).
103 Id. at 1494-95 ("By making black Americans feel that the most visible and oppressive
part of the legal system does not belong to them, mass incarceration's sociological product is
alienation. The alienation begins between black Americans and the criminal system but then fans
out beyond the criminal system into the relationship between black Americans and the state and
society as a whole-inflaming the country's racial tensions and creating problems of democratic
governance with far-reaching and unpredictable political effects. ... The country just can't func-
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Thus, community condemnation, at least to some theorists, both
defines and justifies criminal punishment. Community condemnation
has also been understood as a mechanism to achieve the end goals of
punishment. Durkheim and Kleinfeld identify social coherence as an
end in and of itself, separate and apart from any retributive or utilita-
rian goal.104 Other scholars, however, do not understand the expres-
sive theory as fully distinct from the more traditional theories of
retributivism and utilitarianism, but rather a gloss upon them.10 5 Re-
tributivists, broadly speaking, see punishment as the just deserts for
crime, and consider punishment to be permissible and even morally
obligated on the sole basis that the crime has been committed.1" Utili-
tarians, also called consequentialists, consider punishment justified
only insofar as punishment-a harm-serves some greater societal
good such as deterrence or incapacitation.10 7
Recently, Paul Robinson and others have done important work
linking the retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment by dem-
onstrating the connection between the community's retributive intu-
itions and the efficacy of the criminal justice system. Robinson has
argued that, when punishments deviate from "empirical desert," as
measured by the "community's shared intuitions of justice," the crimi-
nal justice system's deterrence function suffers.108 Compliance with
and respect for the law are dependent upon whether the "community"
perceives the criminal law to have moral credibility and legitimacy.109
Although the idea that the criminal law should track community mo-
tion well with this level of alienation, and if this diagnosis is right-if alienation is at the core of
America's crime/race problem-then solidarity is the right medicine."); id. at 1496 ("Citizens in
a democracy should generally not be alienated from their law because part of what it means to
live in a democracy is to have a nonalienated relationship to the law. But they should especially
not be alienated from their criminal law. Criminal law fails its solidaristic social function, be-
comes oppressive and undemocratic, and destabilizes politics when the members of a community
feel it does not belong to them.").
104 DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 102-03; Kleinfeld, supra note 102, at 1496.
105 Kahan, supra note 97, at 595-96 (citing, and ultimately disagreeing with, scholarship
claiming that expressivism "dissolves into conventional retributive and deterrence theories and
thus need not be independently taken into account").
106 Id. at 602.
107 Kleinfeld, supra note 102, at 1491-92.
108 Robinson, The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 13, at 2017, 2025-26; Robinson, The
Ongoing Revolution, supra note 13, at 1107; Bowers & Robinson, supra note 13, at 218-19;
Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410-26 (2005).
109 Josh Bowers and Paul Robinson identify "legitimacy" as perceived procedural fairness
and "moral credibility" as perceived substantive justice-both of which have been shown to




rality is not newo10 nor without its critics,"'1 Robinson's work has pro-
vided fresh insights into how society's perceptions of both procedural
and substantive justice affect its citizens' willingness to voluntarily
comply with the law.11 2 Interestingly, Robinson and others have
presented empirical research indicating that there actually is wide con-
sensus about appropriate punishment in particularized factual scena-
rios;1 13 this consensus simply-and unfortunately-does not track a
number of key punishment practices we have in place.1 14
Community or societal perceptions of morality have thus been
invoked by scholars from multiple different perspectives who are try-
ing to understand what criminal law is, why punishment is justified,
and how punishment can be effective. Criminal law theory is filled
with references to "the community" or "society," and a number of
prominent theorists operate from a baseline assumption that "the
community" supports the punishment of the defendant. All of this dis-
cussion begs the question: whom are we talking about when we talk
about "the community"?
Some commentators point to the democratic state and its demo-
cratically enacted laws as the legitimate embodiment of "the
community":
110 Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 Amz. ST. L.J. 1151, 1152-53 (2010).
111 Slobogin, supra note 4, at 324 ("[T]he community . .. is generally uninformed-both in
the sense that it has not thought deeply about the relevant issues, and in the sense that it does
not know the legal context in which a given legal provision operates. Therefore,... even knowl-
edge that the community resoundingly disfavors a particular legal formulation should usually be
irrelevant to deserts analysis; while such knowledge might trigger reconsideration of a given rule,
it should not carry any weight in deciding whether that rule is morally defensible.").
112 Others have made similar points. See, e.g., Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 708. In
previous work, I have also pointed analogously to the mass lawbreaking seen throughout the war
on drugs as an indication of how community dissensus on punishment threatens legitimacy of
and compliance with the criminal law. Aliza Plener Cover, On Law-Breaking and Law's Legiti-
macy, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASs 310, 312 (2015). Others, however,
have challenged Robinson regarding the extent to which normative disagreement with the law
breeds noncompliance. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 4, at 323-27.
113 Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 MINN. L. REv. 1829, 1867 (2007) ("[W]e found that, despite the dramatically greater difficulty
of this task over those of previous studies, the levels of agreement in rank ordering were aston-
ishingly high. In other words, we failed to find the limits of shared intuitions of justice for core
wrongdoing."); see also BIBAs, supra note 53, at 119 ("Thus, the basic principles of criminal
blame and responsibility are hardly arbitrary theories that risk provoking unbounded strife. On
the contrary, though there remain pockets of disagreement, there is enormous consensus on a
wide range of core cases.").
114 Robinson, The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 13, at 1974 (reporting results of study of
layperson perceptions of just punishment and noting extreme divergences between actual sen-
tencing law and community views of justice in specific crime-control areas: "drug offense penal-
ties, three-strikes (habitual offender) doctrines, strict liability offenses, and felony murder").
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As Hegel appreciated, the modern state is the citizenry's
moral representative; in the face of pluralism and religious
controversy, it is the only institutional voice of the commu-
nity's shared moral values. Serious crimes represent serious
attacks on those moral views, and in particular, on the con-
ception of worth animating those views, and thus the state is
the only institution that can speak and act on behalf of the
community against the diminishment accomplished by the
crime.115
I agree that the state-rather than, for example, a vigilante mob-is
the only legitimate institution to express "the community."116 Yet the
common reference to "the state" does not fully answer the question,
as state action may be more or less reflective of community sentiment
when it is constrained by different decisionmaking rules. Our own
constitutional system, as discussed above, endorses different decision-
making structures, some majoritarian, some supermajoritarian, some
countermajoritarian, in different contexts, and these structures work
together to create a democratic order. Although a bare majority rule
may have legitimacy according to majoritarian democratic theories of
governance, agreement about punishment practices between 51% of
the community's members against the background of deep contesta-
tion does not solve the practical problems that Robinson identifies,' 7
nor achieve the social solidarity that Durkheim and Kleinfeld seek.118
It would be hard to imagine that Robinson's "community's intuitions
of justice" are the viewpoints of 51% of the population.119 A criminal
law system that is consistent with the moral intuitions of a bare major-
ity of the population would suffer from significant and sustained
problems of legitimacy and moral credibility and, hence, would risk
high levels of disrespect and noncompliance. Decisionmaking rules
that allow for the imposition of punishment with the support of the
bare majority and against the vehement opposition of a large minority
would seem to invite just this type of disrespect for law.
When the social harm of criminalized conduct is contested-
when the community disagrees about the propriety of the illegal con-
duct or the amount of punishment that is warranted-then punish-
ment may actually serve to further fracture, rather than heal, the
115 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1694 (1992).
116 Id.
117 See Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution, supra note 13, at 1090.
118 See DURKHEiM, supra note 4, at 100-10; Kleinfeld, supra note 102, at 1500.
119 See Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution, supra note 13, at 1106-07.
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community.120 In these circumstances, criminal punishment represents
not the expressive condemnation by the unified community of a social
and moral transgressor, but rather the expressive condemnation by
the government of a purely legal transgressor whose conduct is nor-
matively contested. Kleinfeld describes a similar effect and labels it
the destructive force of alienation.121 Recent excesses of the criminal
justice system including the war on drugs, mass incarceration, and dis-
parate treatment of African Americans in these and other criminal
justice phenomena are paradigmatic examples.122
I thus posit that supermajoritarian decisionmaking rules in the
criminal justice context are best situated to achieve the positive ex-
pressive aims of criminal punishment and to do so in a way that en-
hances the solidarity of society,12 3 as well as the legitimacy, moral
credibility, and voluntary compliance with the criminal law.124
In making this argument, I am asserting that supermajority sup-
port for criminal law policy is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the imposition of criminal punishment. I am thus making a differ-
ent point than that asserted by Lord Devlin in his famous debate with
H.L.A. Hart, which was that the criminal law could legitimately pun-
ish behavior condemned as "immoral"-specifically homosexuality.12 5
Devlin's answer condoning the punishment of immorality has gar-
nered significant, though not universal, criticism.126 I, however, am
making a converse point: the law should not be able to punish behav-
ior that the supermajority does not condemn. And when the law does
choose to punish, that punishment may not be harsher than the vast
majority of the community is willing to accept.
From this orientation, the will of the people-as expressed by de-
cisions made through supermajoritarian processes-is best under-
stood as an animating justification for, as well as a check upon,
coercive punishment. The check of supermajoritarian community sup-
120 Cf DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 100-10 (describing criminal law's function as furthering
social solidarity).
121 See Kleinfeld, supra note 102, at 1494-95.
122 See e.g., id.
123 See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 102-03; Kleinfeld, supra note 102, at 1496.
124 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 13, at 211-12, 218-19; Nadler, supra note 108, at
1410-26; Robinson, The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 13, at 2017, 2025-26; Robinson, The
Ongoing Revolution, supra note 13, at 1107.
125 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALs 14 (1965) ("There are no theoretical
limits to the power of the State to legislate against treason and sedition, and likewise I think
there can be no theoretical limits to legislation against immorality.").
126 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 109, 132-33 (1999).
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port-as expressed constitutionally through the institution of the
jury-exists alongside other moral and constitutional ideals which
likewise place limits on the community's ability to realize its desired
policy outcomes. Most significantly, equal protection, due process, and
the prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" mean that the
community is constrained in its criminal lawmaking.
To make this idea concrete, we can consider the punishment of
same-sex intimacy. Under the supermajoritarian principle, if society
evolves such that punishment of same-sex intimacy is no longer en-
dorsed by a supermajority of society, then it would be morally in-
defensible to punish that behavior. The unanimous jury might well
have been a protection against such punishment in the past. On the
other hand, even if a supermajority of society believes that the punish-
ment of same-sex intimacy is permissible, other moral limitations on
punishment-constitutionalized through due process and equal pro-
tection-would prohibit the community from realizing its goal.
II. OUR QUASI-MAJORITARIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Ensuring supermajoritarian support for criminal punishment is
thus important, both from a constitutional perspective and from a the-
oretical one. In this Section, I survey the mechanisms of our criminal
justice system that translate community will into punishment policy.
Because of democracy defects in civic and political participation, it
would be inaccurate to say that early American criminal law was truly
supermajoritarian in practice. But, if we account for that era's
cramped understanding of citizenship, we see that substantive criminal
law, the procedural adjudication of guilt, and the imposition of pun-
ishment all bore certain significant supermajoritarian features. Today,
although our conception of citizenship has broadened and become
more inclusive, the decisionmaking at each of these junctures is gener-
ally majoritarian, at best. In short, the supermajoritarian protections
of the criminal justice system have failed to keep up with our ex-
panding conception of citizenship.127 At the same time, the Supreme
Court's evolving constitutional criminal law and procedure jurispru-
dence-including in the Eighth Amendment arena-has done little to
check the policy choices of majoritarian institutions and ensure that
criminal punishment remains consistent with broad community values.
127 For a similar point, see Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 868 ("[A]s the jury's com-
position became more democratic, its role in American civic life declined.").
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A. Quasi-Supermajoritarian Origin Story
In the colonial and founding eras, not only the criminal justice
system but the political system as a whole had a highly restrictive and
discriminatory understanding of civic participation. As a result, in a
fundamental way, the criminal justice system at and near the time of
the founding functioned as a minoritarian one, with "community" par-
ticipation restricted to white, wealthy men.
At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, "[e]very state
limited jury service to men; every state except Vermont restricted jury
service to property owners or taxpayers; three states permitted only
whites to serve; and one state, Maryland, disqualified atheists."128 In
many instances, these excluded groups were barred from jury service
well after they were given the right to vote.1 2 9 Indeed, some states
denied women the right to serve on juries even after the ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.130 And while, at the founding,
only a minority of states explicitly prohibited African Americans from
jury service, as a practical matter they were excluded-and not only in
slave states.131 Indeed, at the time of the Civil War, "Massachusetts
was the only state that allowed African American men to serve as
jurors."132
Substantive criminal law was also discriminatory in ways that
tracked the exclusion of women and minority groups from jury ser-
vice. Capital punishment laws, for example, were racialized and "for-
mally unequal" in southern states, with vastly more capital offenses
for slaves and free blacks than for whites.133 Black victims, on the
other hand, were devalued: rape of enslaved and later freed black wo-
men was not even a crime.13a
128 Id. at 877.
129 Id. at 878.
130 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federal-
ism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1020-22 (2002).
131 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 884-85 ("So far as we are aware ... the first
African-Americans ever to serve on a jury in America were two who sat in Worcester, Massa-
chusetts, in 1860. Their service was described as 'the first of such instances' in the state's history,
and it was sufficiently unusual to provoke comment elsewhere." (footnote omitted)).
132 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 76, at 1279-80.
133 Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical Perspective,
in FROM LYNCH MOBs To THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
99 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006).
134 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 599 (1990) ("Moreover, as a legal matter, the experience of rape did not even exist for black
women. During slavery, the rape of a black woman by any man, white or black, was simply not a
crime. Even after the Civil War, rape laws were seldom used to protect black women against
either white or black men, since black women were considered promiscuous by nature. In con-
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The civic "community"-though inclusive for its day and age135 -
was thus narrowly defined. Yet within the confines of that narrow con-
ception, criminal law-from crime definition to the imposition of pun-
ishment-enjoyed several features that served to track and implement
the will of those deemed eligible for civic participation. These
supermajoritarian dimensions were a result not only of constitutional-
ized guarantees, but also of certain organic features of the criminal
justice system that developed over time.
The first and most obvious of these supermajoritarian protections
was that the criminal law could not be implemented without the unan-
imous consent of juries drawn from the community. As discussed in
depth above,136 the institution of the jury played a central role in colo-
nial American criminal justice and in the new constitutional order.
The jury trial right was secured not only in the federal Constitution,
but also in every state constitution,137 and in practice the jury played a
robust role in ensuring that criminal punishment corresponded with
community sentiment. 13 8 Juries were not shy to nullify when they
deemed punishment unwarranted or overly harsh.1 39
After a jury convicted, punishment was transparently and pub-
licly imposed.140 The community viscerally understood the conse-
quences of punishment.141 A criminal sentence was not an abstract
number of years in prison, under conditions not fully seen or under-
stood.14 2 It was a punishment-often a violent one-imposed in the
open and in front of the entire community.14 3 The transparency of
trast to the partial or at least formal protection white women had against sexual brutalization,
black women frequently had no legal protection whatsoever. 'Rape,' in this sense, was something
that only happened to white women; what happened to black women was simply life." (footnotes
omitted)).
135 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 877-78.
136 See supra Section I.A.
137 See supra note 54.
138 See Barkow, supra note 63, at 51-53.
139 See supra note 63.
140 BANNER, supra note 63, at 24, 31-32 ("Until the nineteenth century, hangings were
conducted outdoors, often before thousands of spectators, as part of a larger ritual including a
procession to the gallows, a sermon, and a speech by the condemned prisoner. Hangings were
not macabre spectacles staged for a bloodthirsty crowd. A hanging was normally a somber event,
like a church service. Hanging day was a dramatic portrayal, in which everyone could participate,
of the community's desire to suppress wrongdoing. It was a powerful symbolic statement of the
gravity of crime and its consequences. The person hanged had been condemned in court weeks
earlier, but hanging day was a second, more collective condemnation-of the individual and of
crime in general. We have no comparable ritual today.").
141 See id. at 26.
142 See id. at 23.
143 Id. at 24.
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punishment meant that jurors understood the practical significance of
their verdict, and that they could take the severity of punishment into
account when choosing whether to convict.144 Thus, although jurors
had no formal role in the sentencing procedure, juries were intimately
involved in proportionality review of criminal punishment, and their
decision to convict signified community approval of the mandated
sanction.1 45 It also meant that the community as a whole was symboli-
cally involved in the punishment, even as observers.
Moreover, there is reason to think that even the substantive law
itself tracked community intuitions of right and wrong more closely
than it does today. As the common law developed in England and in
early American criminal systems, only a limited number of felonies
existed,146 and these felonies were largely mala in se-wrong in them-
selves.147 Though I imagine it would be nearly impossible to prove this
with certainty, it is reasonable to believe that much conduct labeled
"criminal" was thus broadly condemned as wrongful by the commu-
nity,148 despite the fact that criminal offenses derived from common
law principles rather than the statutory enactments of democratic leg-
islatures.149 Indeed, the supermajoritarian consensus may have been
due, in part, to the fact that the criminal law was the product of centu-
144 Judge Nancy Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving "Intelligible Content" to the Right
to a Jury Trial, 71 OHIo ST. L.J. 935, 937 (2010) ("Colonial juries were fully aware of the implica-
tions of their verdicts. Since most serious offenses were capital crimes, the jury's determination
of guilt had specific and well-known consequences... . Knowing what they did about punish-
ments enabled them to fulfill their constitutional responsibility." (footnotes omitted)); see Kem-
mitt, supra note 61, at 126 ("Common law juries 'authorized' sentences in a very tangible way.
Since the criminal code was substantially simpler, juries understood the connection between con-
viction and punishment and withheld conviction when they disagreed with the resulting punish-
ment. In so doing, jury verdicts authorized the sentences defendants would receive.").
145 Barkow, supra note 63, at 69 ("The unreviewable verdict of acquittal allows the jury to
continue to check the government based on community sentiment. And, it is a power that en-
ables the jury, in effect, to 'create[] [its] own sentencing discretion' based on its sense of justice."
(footnotes omitted)); Kemmitt, supra note 61 (making the case for the historical jury as a sen-
tencing or quasi-sentencing body).
146 See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV.
59, 64-65 (2004).
147 BIBAs, supra note 53, at 2 ("For the most part, law was not some newfangled imposition
by distant bureaucrats. It reflected the communal moral consensus, the common-law sense of
what had always been God's law and man's. Most crimes were not recent creations of the legisla-
ture, but the basic mala in se, the acts that everyone knew were wrong and forbidden.").
148 Bibas, supra note 16, at 1680-81 ("Lay involvement and control were crucial to colonial
criminal justice's efficacy. Crimes were defined by the common law, not a technical penal code,
and were mala in se. They accorded with widely shared intuitions about justice and punishment,
giving potential violators ample notice."); id. at 1683 ("[T]he colonists had something we lack
today: a participatory, democratic justice system, attuned to local needs and moral intuitions.").
149 BIBAs, supra note 53, at 2.
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ries of common law development.150 This is not to say that all people
in the community agreed with the severity or nature of punishment
imposed for particular crimes. As discussed above, community disa-
greement with the severity of punishment for many common law
crimes led to jury nullification'51 and eventually to criminal justice re-
forms such as the division of murder into degrees.152 Despite disputes
over punishment, however, the wrongfulness of most criminally pro-
hibited conduct was likely relatively uncontroversial.1 5 3
The early American system was thus marked by a mixture of ex-
clusion and inclusion. The civic community was defined narrowly, but
criminal law outcomes were tied to the supermajoritarian consent of
this group. From this ambivalent history, one can decipher a promise
of true supermajoritarianism: if the understanding of citizenship could
be expanded, a genuinely supermajoritarian criminal justice system
could arise.
B. The Shift to Quasi-Majoritarianism
Today, our understanding of the civic community has expanded
and, at least formally, embraces women, minorities, and the poor. Yet
the promise of a supermajoritarian criminal justice system has not
been realized. Significant changes in criminal justice politics and prac-
tice have fundamentally altered the supermajoritarian dynamics visi-
ble in the early American system. Today, criminal lawmaking,
adjudication of guilt, and imposition of punishment all have a dis-
tinctly majoritarian or even quasi-majoritarian orientation.
Modem criminal offenses are the product of majoritarian legisla-
tive processes rather than common law development.154 Of course,
crimes rooted in the common law still abound, but criminal offenses
today are enumerated as statutes in criminal codes . 55 This shift away
from common law crimes serves important democratic goals and prin-
ciples of justice that support, if not demand, the existence of statuto-
150 See Bibas, supra note 16, at 1682.
151 See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 63, at 90-91; Barkow, supra note 63, at 51-59 (describing
a robust history of jury nullification in the eighteenth century).
152 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. 1980); Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond
Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law Enforcement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 713-14
(2016).
153 Bibas, supra note 16, at 1680-81.
154 Neil Cohnan McCabe, State Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP. L.




rily enacted criminal codes.5 6 But the "democratic" ideal here is
majoritarian, not supermajoritarian. Ironically, the codification of the
criminal law has had at least two effects that work against community
consensus on criminal punishment.
The first effect is that criminal law codification has led to an ex-
plosion of criminal laws, including a significant increase in regulatory
criminal offenses and, consequently, increasingly blurred lines be-
tween criminal and civil law. Today, we punish an extraordinarily vast
array of crimes-so vast that it cannot be said that most citizens are
even aware of the crimes that exist, let alone agree with all of them.57
The criminal law has expanded both in its breadth and depth. We pun-
ish more conduct than we used to, and we punish specific types of
conduct in more ways, so that a single wrongful act may carry multiple
types of criminal liability. 58 Moreover, while a bedrock principle of
the common law was the idea that some kind of culpable mens rea
would be necessary for criminal responsibility,159 we have seen a sig-
nificant expansion of strict liability crimes,160 as well as an expansion
of malum prohibitum rather than malum in se crimes.161 It is often
hard to decipher why "crimes" are punished criminally rather than
civilly, or even which category they belong in.162 The expansion of
criminal law, and in particular the expansion of criminal law into the
156 George P. Fletcher, Political Theory and Criminal Law, 25 CRIM. JUST. ETrucs 18, 23
(2006) (describing liberal commitment to "legislation as the proper means of defining the crimi-
nal law"); Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1131-32 (1978) ("Codification . . . represented an attack on the power of
lawyers and judges to make and declare law without democratic participation. It offered a
plainly articulated body of laws accessible to and understandable by all in place of the oracular,
mysterious incantation of doctrinal technicalities by lawyers and judges. And it placed the power
over the law squarely in the hands of the people's elected representatives in the legislature.").
157 See Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REv. 755, 768 (2004) ("The
single most visible development in the substantive criminal law is that the sheer number of crimi-
nal offenses has grown exponentially.").
158 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,
512-19 (2001) (detailing the breadth and depth of today's state and federal criminal laws).
159 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.
It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.").
160 W. Robert Thomas, Note, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for
Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free World, 110 MICH. L. REv. 647, 659 (2012).
161 See Ouziel, supra note 152, at 715 ("By the early twentieth century, the criminal law had
expanded its function beyond societal condemnation, to the regulation of economic and social
activity.").
162 See supra note 92.
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regulatory arena, may create a schism between the community's moral
consensus and the code book.
The second consensus-diminishing effect of criminal law codifica-
tion is that criminal law now exists squarely in the political arena. This
shift may have democratic benefits, but it also infuses an explicitly
majoritarian, rather than supermajoritarian, ethos into criminal law-
making. Criminal statutes become law not if "the community" over
time agrees that these statutes represent its values, but rather if 51%
of legislators do.1 63 Modem criminalization occurs even in the face of
contested party politics. Although a number of criminal justice poli-
cies that are controversial today were passed with broad bipartisan
support,164 partisan criminal justice policy is no small concern. Society
has become increasingly polarized, with sharp disagreement between
different factions about fundamental policies and moral priorities, in-
cluding in the criminal arena.65 Moreover, statutory criminal law
leaves room for the defects of the modern electoral system to infect
the criminal law system as well. Growing empirical evidence reported
in legal and political science scholarship suggests that the supposedly
majoritarian political branches do not even live up to the label
"majoritarian."1 66 Electoral processes that suppress the realization of
the majority's preferences include voter suppression, partisan gerry-
mandering, outsized power of special interest groups and big money in
politics, and gaps in legislators' understanding of public sentiment.
These dynamics are especially true in the criminal context, where po-
litical pressure to be "tough on crime" may outpace considered com-
munity sentiment.167
163 There are some supermajoritarian dynamics in legislative processes even today. A fili-
buster in the U.S. Senate can only be overcome by a three-fifths vote to bring debate to a close.
S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 113-18, at 15-16
(2013). About 10 states have supermajority cloture rules. Paige Scobee, Ahoy! The Future of the
Filibuster, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES BLOG (June 29, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/
2016/06/29/ahoy-the-future-of-the-filibuster.aspx [https://perma.cc/7G3F-LFRC] (citing MEGHAN
REILLY, OFF. OF LEGIs. REs., STATES LIMITING LEGISLATIVE DEBATE (2009)). Moreover, as
McGinnis and Rappaport argue, bicameralism and the presidential veto create a de facto
supermajoritarianism, as well. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 712-16.
164 For example, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") passed
91-8 in the Senate and 293-133 in the House. S. 735, H.R. 104-518, 104th Cong. (1996). The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 passed the Senate by a vote of 91-1. S. 1762, 98th
Cong. (1984).
165 See supra notes 9-10.
166 Lain, supra note 10, at 115-16, 146-57; see also Graber, supra note 10, at 362-63 (re-
viewing political science literature focusing on "countermajoritarian difficulties" within the polit-
ical branches).
167 Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
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Though the "countermajoritarian difficulty" in the electoral insti-
tutions is problematic across multiple policy dimensions, the threat of
minoritarian or even bare majoritarian rule is particularly pernicious
in the context of criminal law. This is so because, as described above, a
core conceptual justification for the idea of criminal punishment-the
intentional imposition of pain and deprivation of liberty upon citi-
zens-rests upon the collective will of the community. More practi-
cally, criminal punishment represents the zenith of law's coercive
power, and the democratic bona fides of criminal laws are thus partic-
ularly important.168
On the ground, perhaps as a result of some of these difficulties in
translating majority sentiment into enacted law, scholars have identi-
fied disconnects between actual community sentiment and existing
punishment policies.169 None of this is to deny that some-perhaps
even most-criminal laws enjoy widespread community support. But
the mere existence of a criminal offense in the code books does not
guarantee that it is in fact condemned by a majority-let alone a
supermajority-of the jurisdiction's citizens.
Criminal statutes have thus multiplied at the will of majoritarian
legislatures. At the same time, the most significant supermajoritarian
check on the imposition of punishment, the institution of the jury, has
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. REv. 747, 773-74 (2005) (describing psychological and
political dynamics which lead to "a one way ratchet toward the enactment of additional crimes
and harsher penalties"); see also Barkow, supra note 63, at 62 (discussing the contrast between
abstract public opinion and more considered, and less harsh, punishment preferences when faced
with individual cases).
168 See Myers, supra note 7, at 1334 ("Criminal law ought to be different from ordinary law
because it punishes, often very severely, based on what should be broadly held moral commit-
ments. Given the stakes, the politics of criminal law should be better, not worse, than ordinary
politics." (footnote omitted)).
169 See Murray, supra note 10, at 5 (reporting results of experimental national survey, find-
ing that "[olver 60% oppose the inflexible imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence and
would give the individual sentencing judge the freedom to depart below it. This position holds
across conditions involving the race, prior criminal history and mitigating personal factors of the
offender."); see also id. at 5 & n.19 (citing "[r]ecent surveys and referenda indicat[ing] that public
opinion is becoming even more opposed to lengthy custodial sentences, particularly for non-
violent offenders"); Robinson, The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 13, at 2025 (concluding,
based upon empirical research, that "[t]he current crime-control doctrines seriously conflict with
people's intuitions of justice by exaggerating the punishment deserved"); Robinson, The Ongo-
ing Revolution, supra note 13, at 1107 ("One may well ask how well current American criminal
law matches the community's intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modern crime-
control programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, adult prosecution of
juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability offenses, and the felony-murder rule, all
distribute criminal liability and punishment in ways that seriously conflict with lay persons' intu-
itions of justice.").
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atrophied. The American jury trial is a vanishing phenomenon.
Roughly 94% of state criminal convictions are the product of a guilty
plea rather than a jury trial,' 7 0 thus diminishing the community's voice
in the criminal process overall. In today's system of pleas, the primary
adjudication tends to be the sentencing hearing before the judge,
rather than a public jury trial before the community.17 1 In most states
and under federal law, there is no right to a jury at sentencing other
than in capital cases.17 2
The Supreme Court has on occasion grudgingly approved and at
other times actively encouraged the practice of plea bargaining that
has led to the demise of the jury trial. 73 At no time has the Court
meaningfully limited the practice. Interestingly, over the course of the
past two decades, the Court has revolutionized its sentencing jurispru-
dence by expanding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determina-
tion of facts that were once considered "sentencing factors" for a
judge to decide.17 4 Yet this interest has not translated into an increased
practical role for the jury. For instance, in United States v. Booker,1 7 5
the Court struck down as unconstitutional the mandatory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, because the Guidelines required judges to in-
crease punishment on the basis of judicial fact-finding beyond what
would be permissible on the basis of the jury's verdict.176 The remedy,
170 See supra note 21.
171 See The Honorable Robert J. Conrad, Jr., & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal
Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEo. WASH. L. RaV. 99, 102 (2018)
("Once viewed as 'trial judges,' federal district judges are increasingly seen as 'sentencing
judges."'); id. at 157 ("The absence of jury trials makes the judicial process more secretive and
contravenes the 'presumption of openness [that] inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under [the American] system of justice.' Trials provide a public forum for the airing of griev-
ances, yet the death of trials marks the end of doing justice where disputes are played out under
the attentive eye of judge and jury." (footnote omitted)).
172 See Hoffman, supra note 65, at 966 n.58 (identifying, as of 2003, five states that man-
dated noncapital jury sentencing-Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia).
173 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("It follows that, by tolerat-
ing and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitution-
ally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to
persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 751-53 (1970) (endorsing guilty pleas as constitutional and explaining the "mutuality of
advantage" achieved by plea bargaining); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today, . . . the Supreme Court of the United States elevates plea bar-
gaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement. It is no longer a somewhat embar-
rassing adjunct to our criminal justice system; rather, as the Court announces in the companion
case to this one, 'it is the criminal justice system."').
174 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
175 543 U.S. 220 (2005).




however, was not a more robust role for the jury, but rather advisory
guidelines and an increase in discretion for judges.177
Many have lamented the decline in the jury trial for a host of
compelling reasons. 17  For present purposes, it is important to note
that, without the jury trial, the primary structural supermajoritarian
protection in the criminal justice system has disappeared as well. The
key criminal justice decisionmakers are no longer unanimous or even
supermajoritarian jurors but rather are elected, majoritarian prosecu-
tors and, to a lesser extent, judges.179
Much recent scholarship has focused on the enormous power of
prosecutors in a system dominated by plea bargaining.o80 Criminal jus-
tice outcomes are heavily dependent on the bargaining decisions of
prosecutors, who have largely unbridled discretion to leverage their
charging power to secure guilty pleas.'8 ' As Jocelyn Simonson has ex-
plained, traditional conceptions of criminal procedure, from the
names of criminal cases to the Supreme Court's constitutional crimi-
nal procedure doctrine, take as a given that prosecutorial interests are
aligned with those of "the people."8 Yet the assumption that prose-
cutors represent the community as a whole is simply inaccurate.8 3
177 Id. at 245 (announcing the constitutional remedy).
178 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 63, at 36-38 (expressing concern over the loss of the jury
as "safety valve" against enforcement of "overinclusive or overrigid criminal laws"); Bibas, supra
note 16, at 1678 (describing how "professionals have displaced this democratic morality play
with a bureaucratic plea bargaining machine" that makes the justice system opaque and inacces-
sible to laypeople); Conrad & Clements, supra note 171, at 157-63 (describing how the decline of
the jury trial has had harmful impacts in such areas as public accountability, the evolution of law,
defendants' rights, and civic participation through jury service); Iontcheva, supra note 63, at
338-53 (detailing democratic harms caused by the loss of jury sentencing).
179 See John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison
Growth, 111 MICH. L. REv. 1087, 1106 (2013) (asserting that "almost all the growth in prison
populations [since 1994] has come from prosecutors' decisions to file felony charges"); Stuntz,
supra note 158, at 537-38.
180 See generally JoHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN (2017) (examining the role of prosecutorial
power in the rise of mass incarceration); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 961 (2009); Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshef-
sky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 301, 305 (2017); Jason
Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REv. 771, 773 (2017); John F. Pfaff, The Micro
and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1254 (2012); Pfaff, supra note
179, at 1106; Stuntz, supra note 158, at 533-39.
181 See Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 180, at 311 ("[T]he availability of mandatory
minimum sentences increased the leverage provided to the prosecutor in charging and in plea
negotiations."); see also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23, at 927 ("Today prosecutors are the
judges of law and fact.").
182 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of "the People" in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 23-32) (on file with author).
183 Id. at 33-35.
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Chief prosecutors are sometimes appointed, as in the federal system,
but at the state and local level they are generally elected.84 At best,
the electoral system ensures majoritarian support for prosecutors. Yet
the democracy deficits in legislative elections, discussed above, may be
exacerbated in the election of local prosecutors,185 and the communi-
ties most affected by prosecutorial practices tend to be those most
marginalized from electoral politics. 18 6
Moreover, plea bargaining has driven the operations of the crimi-
nal justice system outside the eye of the community at large.'87 The
loss of the public jury trial entails a loss of transparency in reaching
criminal justice outcomes.188 Plea bargaining occurs outside the court-
room and agreements are reached without public understanding.18 9
The community has been evicted not only from its decisionmaking
role but also from its observational one.19 0
For better or worse,191 we have sidestepped the constitutionally
mandated procedures that structured criminal justice decisionmaking
in a way that ensured supermajoritarian support. Some would surely
argue-and the Supreme Court has held 92-that this sidestepping is
legitimate and constitutional. The Constitution guarantees-but does
184 Miriam H. Baer, Sorting out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEx. L. REv. 225, 262 (2018); Ron-
ald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REv. 593, 598 (2014). Line prosecutors,
by contrast, are unelected professionals, sometimes in their positions for the long term and
sometimes transitory.
185 See Bibas, supra note 180, at 961; Kreag, supra note 180, at 776-77; David W. Rasmus-
sen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
679, 720 (2003); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
583 (2009); Wright, supra note 184, at 599-600.
186 Simonson, supra note 182 (manuscript at 5) ("[Tlhe unequal distribution of political
power means that the decisions of 'the People' are often not responsive to the interests of the
poor populations of color most likely to come into contact with the criminal process as arrestees,
defendants, or victims."). Interestingly, however, in recent years there has been a number of
noteworthy prosecutorial elections in which progressive candidates have won on promises to
reduce, not increase, incarceration. David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for
Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 647-49 (2017).
187 Bibas, supra note 16, at 1678; Conrad & Clements, supra note 171, at 157-59.
188 See Conrad & Clements, supra note 171, at 157.
189 See id. at 157-58.
190 See id. at 158-59.
191 While many academics and judges bemoan the victory of plea bargaining over the jury
trial, others see some benefits in the efficiency and managed risk of the plea bargaining system.
For some defenses of plea bargaining, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compro-
mise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978 (1992); Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA.
L. REV. 599, 636 (2005); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1968 (1992).
192 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
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not require-a jury trial.193 Yet while each instance of plea bargaining
may be constitutional, a net harm-or at least a seismic shift-has
nonetheless occurred. There has been a reorientation of the constitu-
tionally designed allocation of power and a serious diminution in the
structural assurance of supermajoritarian support for punishment.
Even in the six percent or so of cases where the jury does play a
role in deciding punishment,194 the modern institution is a weakened
version of its historical form. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, the jury served as a substantive supermajoritarian check on pun-
ishment because it was entrusted with significant power to decide
questions of fact and law.195 The jury today is, in the words of Akhil
Amar, a "shadow of its former self."1 96 It may decide questions of fact,
not of law. 197 In most cases, the jury is prohibited from learning the
punishment consequences of its decisions, which prevents the jury
from acting as the moral conscience of the community in imposing
punishment.198 Some judges have even been prevented from cor-
recting jurors' misperceptions about the severity of punishment.199
Nor are modern juries instructed on their power to nullify or to act in
the interest of justice.200
193 Another argument, which is that the jury is a structural feature of democracy rather
than a waivable right, can be made by looking not at the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees
the right to a jury trial, but instead at Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, which requires that "[tihe
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 3 (emphasis added); see Amar, supra note 41, at 1183, 1196-97.
194 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
195 See supra note 60.
196 Amar, supra note 41, at 1190.
197 Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); Sparf v. United States, 156
U.S. 51, 102 (1895); AMAR, supra note 22, at 238; Kemmitt, supra note 61, at 94-98 (lamenting
the ahistorical reconceptualization of the jury as a fact-finding rather than law-finding or sen-
tencing body).
198 See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) ("It is well established that when
a jury has no sentencing function, it should be admonished to 'reach its verdict without regard to
what sentence might be imposed.' . . . [P]roviding jurors sentencing information invites them to
ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsi-
bilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion." (citation omitted)); see also Gertner, supra
note 144, at 937 ("Modern juries, in contrast [to colonial juries], are not told by the court about
mandatory punishments. They are admonished that punishment is exclusively for the judge. Not
surprisingly, they are often shocked when, after their verdict, they learn of the severe sentences
the law, particularly federal law, requires." (footnotes omitted)).
199 In United States v. Pabon-Cruz, the Second Circuit upheld a conviction in which Judge
Gerald Lynch had been prevented by mandamus order of the Second Circuit from instructing
the jury as to the sentencing consequences of a conviction for advertising child pornography. 391
F.3d 86, 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2004).
200 Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 257 (1996)
("Current practice-with few exceptions-is not to instruct juries that they may nullify."); see
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The capital context may be one of the few areas in which the
unanimous jury today has a meaningful role to play. As a result of
nearly 50 years of Supreme Court precedent, sentencing juries are
tasked with deciding not only guilt and innocence, but also whether
life or death is the appropriate sentence.201 Even in this area, however,
we see a paradigmatic example of how the supermajoritarian jury has
been substantially weakened.
Historically, jurors' belief that a punishment-especially the pun-
ishment of death-was categorically too harsh was the basis for leni-
ency and a critical component of the supermajoritarian function of the
jury.202 In the modern age, however, through the process of "death
qualification," prosecutors are entitled to strike for cause members of
the jury venire who are "substantially impair[ed]" in their ability to
consider imposing the penalty of death due to their conscientious ob-
jections.203 Yet this conviction that the death penalty was "cruel and
unusual" was precisely the kind of law finding authorized to juries in
early America.204 Some might argue that death qualification, like
other voir dire practices that remove extreme or partisan venire mem-
bers from the jury, is simply a mechanism to ensure that the outcome
of jury trials is not held hostage by fringe viewpoints, but rather so it
can track the viewpoint of the majority (or even the supermajority).205
Yet there is evidence that death qualification can remove sizeable por-
tions of the community. In a study I conducted of capital jury selection
in Louisiana from 2009 to 2014, I found that just over 22% of venire
also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Inasmuch as no juror has a right
to engage in nullification-and, on the contrary, it is a violation of a juror's sworn duty to follow
the law as instructed by the court-trial courts have the duty to forestall or prevent such con-
duct, whether by firm instruction or admonition or, where it does not interfere with guaranteed
rights or the need to protect the secrecy of jury deliberations by dismissal of an offending juror
from the venire or the jury." (citation omitted)).
201 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016) ("The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not
a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death."); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 609 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment prohibits "a sentencing judge, sitting without
a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty").
202 See supra note 151.
203 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) ("[A] prospective juror may be excluded
for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment . . . [when] the juror's views would
'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath."').
204 Cohen & Smith, supra note 60, at 88-89.
205 Cf Amar, supra note 52, at 1190 ("[I]f everyone now gets to serve on a jury, and we
eliminate all the old undemocratic barriers, preserving unanimity might also be undemocratic,
for it would create an extreme minority veto unknown to the Founders. In practice this minority
veto could disempower juries by preventing an intolerably large percentage of jury cases from
ever reaching a final verdict.").
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members were removed on the basis of their objections to the death
penalty.206 In one trial, the percentage was as high as 32%.207 Both
within and outside the capital context, other practices during jury se-
lection-from prosecutorial peremptory challenges208 to challenges
for cause on the basis of disagreement with the war on drugs209- Simi-
larly constrain the ability of the jury to represent the range of moral
viewpoints of the community.
Finally, punishment practices, which once took place in the public
square, are today veiled in secrecy. The public has little understanding
of what happens inside prisons.210 Even the death penalty-which one
might think that citizens can viscerally understand-is sanitized21 1 and
hidden from the public.2 1 2 During Clayton Lockett's execution in
Oklahoma, Lockett regained consciousness and expressed pain; prison
administrators closed the blinds and shielded him from view.2 13
206 Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment's Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and
Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 133 (2016).
207 Id. at 133-34.
208 See, e.g., EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELEC-
noN: A CONTINUING LEGACY 5 (2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimina-
tion-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A3L-D2QK]; Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analy-
sis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1982).
209 See United States v. McCarthy, 961 F.2d 972, 976 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal for
cause based upon juror "indicating that he favored the legalization of drugs").
210 See Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of
Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 435, 436-37 (2014) ("After the trial ... even our
professed commitment to transparency stops. While we, as a society, may have participated in
the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of the crime, society is practically barred from evalu-
ating the punishment itself.").
211 See Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Using drugs meant for individuals
with medical needs to carry out executions is a misguided effort to mask the brutality of execu-
tions by making them look serene and peaceful-like something any one of us might experience
in our final moments. But executions are, in fact, nothing like that. They are brutal, savage
events, and nothing the state tries to do can mask that reality. Nor should it. If we as a society
want to carry out executions, we should be willing to face the fact that the state is committing a
horrendous brutality on our behalf. ... Sure, firing squads can be messy, but if we are willing to
carry out executions, we should not shield ourselves from the reality that we are shedding human
blood. If we, as a society, cannot stomach the splatter from an execution carried out by firing
squad, then we shouldn't be carrying out executions at all." (citation omitted)).
212 Over the past two decades, states have actively sought to keep lethal injection protocols
and sources secret. See, e.g., Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due
Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1388-95 (2014) (detailing state efforts to ensure lethal injection
secrecy and judicial acquiescence); Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How
Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 122 (2007).
213 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("When the
paralytic and potassium chloride were administered, however, Lockett awoke. Various witnesses
reported that Lockett began to writhe against his restraints, saying, '[t]his s* * * is f* * *ing with
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One aspect of the modem jury which may make it more
supermajoritarian than during the founding era is the increased diver-
sity of jurors. It is no longer legal to exclude jurors from service on the
basis of race or gender,2 1 4 and defendants are guaranteed a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community.215 However juries should
not be overstated. Jurors of color are regularly and disproportionately
excluded from service, through mechanisms including peremptory
challenges,2 1 6 felon disenfranchisement,217 use of voting rolls and mo-
tor vehicle records as the basis for juror rolls,218 and hardship ex-
cusals.219 Though our conception of the civic community has
broadened since the founding, we have not yet achieved true repre-
sentativeness on our juries, even in the rare cases when they have a
role to play.
C. The Majoritarian Eighth Amendment
Certain key features of the criminal justice system, therefore,
have evolved so as to weaken the link between criminal punishment
and the will of a supermajority of the community. Compounding these
trends, judicial interpretations of the Eighth Amendment-which
could conceivably rein in majoritarian excesses-have explicitly en-
dorsed a majoritarian, rather than countermajoritarian or
supermajoritarian, approach to regulating the permissible scope of
punishment.220
my mind,' 'something is wrong,' and '[t]he drugs aren't working.' State officials ordered the
blinds lowered, then halted the execution. But 10 minutes later-approximately 40 minutes after
the execution began-Lockett was pronounced dead." (citations omitted)).
214 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83-84
(1986).
215 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
216 Aliza Plener Cover, Hybrid Jury Strikes, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 365-66
(2017) (collecting sources showing disproportionate exercise of peremptory challenges by prose-
cutors against black jurors); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 208, at 5.
217 Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Vio-
lates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 387, 415-16 (2016) (describing the racially disparate
effect of felon disenfranchisement).
218 Id. at 416.
219 See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 326 n.2 (2010) ("Because such factors dispropor-
tionately affect African-Americans, the Sixth Circuit said, Kent County's routine grants of cer-
tain hardship exemptions 'produced systematic exclusion within the meaning of Duren.' The
Sixth Circuit held, however, that the hardship exemptions could not establish a fair-cross-section
claim because the State 'has a significant interest [in] avoiding undue burdens on individuals' by
allowing such excuses." (citation omitted)).
220 The strengthened criminal procedure protections that we have seen since the Warren
Court and beyond, such as the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to effective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Wash-
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The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of "cruel and
unusual punishments."221 In previous works, I have argued that the
Eighth Amendment, situated among the other countermajoritarian
protections in the Bill of Rights, should be understood as a counter-
majoritarian protection against cruel punishments authorized by the
majority, particularly where discriminatorily imposed upon minori-
ties.2 2 2 The Supreme Court, however, has linked Eighth Amendment
doctrine to indicators of majoritarian preferences and has often ren-
dered the Eighth Amendment subservient to majority will, rather than
a limitation upon it.
The Eighth Amendment as interpreted since the 1950s has been
tethered to contemporary understandings of morality. The contours of
"cruel and unusual punishment" are largely, though not exclusively,223
set by referencing popular norms-by ascertaining society's "evolving
standards of decency"224 on permissible punishment. The Supreme
Court gauges these "evolving standards of decency" through reference
to "objective indicators"-focusing most heavily on majoritarian state
legislation and relying, as well, on jury sentencing practices.2 2 5
The Supreme Court has most actively discussed the Eighth
Amendment and "evolving standards of decency" in the context of the
death penalty. Since the 1970s, the Court has upheld the constitution-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a reinvigorated right to confrontation, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), a strengthened right to a jury determination of facts formerly labeled "sentencing
factors," Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and evolution in the judicial understand-
ing of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), all serve to place some checks on the majoritarian
criminal justice system. However, they are primarily (a) trans-substantive, focusing on procedu-
ral fairness and (b) not supermajoritarian. These doctrines do not impact the quantity of punish-
ment that is imposed once the procedures are followed or the degree of public support needed as
a prerequisite for punishment.
221 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
222 See generally Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the Counter-
Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141 (2014).
223 In the death penalty context, the Court has also applied its own independent judgment
to the question of constitutionality. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)) ("[T]he Constitution contem-
plates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.").
224 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.").
225 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331,
335 (1989) abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 ("The clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.
We have also looked to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries.").
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ality of capital punishment, while actively regulating and restricting its
use through the Eighth Amendment.2 26 The conclusion in Gregg v.
Georgia2 27 that the death penalty was not inherently "cruel and unu-
sual" was itself based largely on strong empirical evidence of national
support for the death penalty, including the post-Furman re-enact-
ment of death penalty statutes by 35 state legislatures and by Con-
gress.2 28 More recently, the Court has used the concept of "evolving
standards of decency" to prohibit particular capital punishment prac-
tices, including the execution of juveniles 229 and individuals with intel-
lectual disability230 and the use of the death penalty to punish
nonhomicidal rape2 3 1 and felony murder where the defendant neither
killed nor had sufficient mens rea with respect to the killing.
232 While
the Court has always asserted the ultimate supremacy of its indepen-
dent constitutional judgment over its inquiry into the objective indica-
tors of "evolving standards of decency,"233 the result reached by the
Court has never departed from its reading of those contemporary
standards in any death penalty case.23 4 The justificatory significance of
majoritarian preferences may be most pronounced in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia235 and Roper v. Simmons,236 in which the Court held that individ-
uals with intellectual disability and juveniles could not be executed.
Both of these cases reached opposite conclusions of cases decided less
than two decades earlier in Penry v. Lynaugh237 and Stanford v. Ken-
tucky.2 3 8 The Court reversed course not by saying it had been wrong
226 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 321.
227 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976) (plurality opinion).
228 The Court also noted the sentencing of 460 individuals to death by March of 1976. See
id.
229 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
230 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
231 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (holding death penalty unconstitutional
for nonhomicidal rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(holding death penalty unconstitutional for nonhomicidal rape of adult woman).
232 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158
(1987) (limiting scope of Enmund).
233 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
234 Miller v. Alabama, which relied on the force of precedent rather than an analysis of
legislative enactments to strike down mandatory life without parole for juveniles, came the clos-
est to deviating from contrary evidence of "evolving standards of decency." 567 U.S. 460, 483
(2012); id. at 514 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("What today's decision shows is that our Eighth Amend-
ment cases are no longer tied to any objective indicia of society's standards. Our Eighth Amend-
ment case law is now entirely inward looking.").
235 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
236 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
237 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
238 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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before but rather by relying on updated information about "evolving
standards of decency."239 The scope of Eighth Amendment protection
expanded on account of a new reading of majoritarian preferences.240
Outside the capital context, when reviewing the constitutionality
of prison sentences, the Supreme Court has focused the Eighth
Amendment inquiry upon whether the punishment is "grossly dispro-
portionate" to the crimes committed,241 without often invoking the
terminology of "evolving standards of decency." In the major cases on
gross disproportionality in prison sentencing, the "evolving standards
of decency" language is cited only in dissents.242 However, the Court
has reaffirmed in two recent cases on sentencing juveniles to life with-
out parole that proportionality review of prison sentences remains
tied to "evolving standards of decency."243 And if anything, the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the prison sentencing
context is even more, not less, obsequious to external, majoritarian
indicators of societal norms by affording heavy deference to legislative
policy choices.2" In the Court's view, the Eighth Amendment and the
239 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 ("[I]n Atkins[,] [w]e held that standards of decency have evolved
since Penry and now demonstrate that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unu-
sual punishment."); id. at 574 ("To the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective
indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989 it suffices to note that those indicia have changed."
(citation omitted)).
240 See id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What a mockery today's opinion makes of Hamil-
ton's expectation, announcing the Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has
changed over the past 15 years-not, mind you, that this Court's decision 15 years ago was
wrong, but that the Constitution has changed."); Cover, supra note 222, at 1174-75; John F.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Inno-
vation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2008).
241 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[The Eighth Amendment] forbids only extreme sentences that are
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.").
242 See id. at 1012-13, 1015 (white, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 291-92
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). But see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) ("[The Eighth
Amendment] prohibits penalties . . . that transgress today's 'broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency."').
243 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012) ("'[T]he concept of proportionality is cen-
tral to the Eighth Amendment.' And we view that concept less through a historical prism than
according to 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'
(citations omitted)); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) ("To determine whether a punish-
ment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to 'the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'); id. at 85 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("'[E]volving standards of decency' have played a central role in our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence for at least a century . . . .").
244 The Supreme Court once assessed the proportionality of prison sentences with the help
of "objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
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judiciary place few if any limits on legislatively sanctioned harsh pun-
ishment for noncapital crimes, including nonviolent offenses such as
drug crime. The responsibility for setting and enforcing prison
sentences resides almost exclusively within the purview of the political
branches, with only the slightest role for deferential judicial review.245
And the modicum of power that the Eighth Amendment retains over
prison sentencing practices is constrained and defined by the
majoritarian considerations described above.
As a result, the Eighth Amendment has done virtually nothing to
stem the tide of punishment endorsed by majoritarian or quasi-
majoritarian legislatures. In its deferential stance, the Court has up-
held against Eighth Amendment challenge a sentence of life without
parole for a defendant convicted of possession of more than 650 grams
of cocaine;246 a sentence of 25 years to life for a recidivist convicted of
stealing three golf clubs worth approximately $400 a piece;247 and "two
consecutive terms of 25 years to life" to a recidivist convicted of
"stealing approximately $150 in videotapes."2 4 8
This constitutional orientation toward contemporary social norms
has costs and benefits. To proponents of living constitutionalism, the
"evolving standards of decency" doctrine prevents the Eighth Amend-
ment from becoming a dead letter.2 4 9 The scope of the Amendment's
protection is not constrained, as Justice Thomas would like it to be, by
the sensibilities of the eighteenth century framers about barbarous
methods of punishment.25 0 Instead, the Eighth Amendment protects
292 (1983). After Solem v. Helm, however, the Court has moved more directly to legislative
deference. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (plurality opinion) (citing Harme-
lin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (not requiring a rigorous "comparative analy-
sis 'within and between jurisdictions"' and identifying "the primacy of the legislature" as one of
four key factors in assessing constitutionality of prison sentences); id. at 28 ("We do not sit as a
'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy choices. It is enough that the State of California
has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons
'advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial way."').
245 E.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20-28 (summarizing caselaw on proportionality principle in
noncapital cases, emphasizing legislative primacy, and applying the caselaw to California's three-
strikes law with heavy deference to state legislature). Elsewhere, I have critiqued the Court's
weak and deferential jurisprudence in the prison-sentencing context as an abdication of its obli-
gation to enforce the countermajoritarian Eighth Amendment. Cover, supra note 222, at 1171.
246 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 996.
247 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18, 30-31.
248 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003).
249 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) ("A claim that punishment is excessive is
judged not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody
Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.").
250 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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against punishments that would have been acceptable-or completely
unheard of-to the founding generation, or even a single generation
before.251 A dynamic, participatory Eighth Amendment promises en-
gagement and responsiveness between the people and the law.
The "evolving standards of decency" doctrine also has its
problems and contradictions. One common critique is that indicators
of "evolving standards of decency" are inherently contested and mal-
leable, and the doctrine obscures the Justices' ultimately subjective in-
quiry into whether punishment is tolerable or intolerable.252 There is
some merit to this critique in the death penalty context;2 53 yet "evolv-
ing standards of decency" doctrine has, at the very least, constrained
the Justices in such a way that they have never decided a capital pun-
ishment case without a plausible argument for national consensus on
their side.
A second major critique-and in some ways, a contradictory
one-is that, through this doctrine, the countermajoritarian judicial
branch, interpreting a countermajoritarian individual right, binds itself
to the whims of the majority.254 A majoritarian Eighth Amendment
loses its power as a countermajoritarian check against overreaching by
the political branches.2 5 5 Where the majority leads, the Supreme Court
follows. 2 56 And, as a consequence, as interpreted by the Court, the
Eighth Amendment has had little impact outside narrow doctrinal
contexts,257 most prominently capital punishment; and even there, the
251 See supra notes 239-43 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial and, in the
Court's view, societal evolution over less than a generation from Penry and Stanford to Atkins
and Roper).
252 There has been significant criticism, including from members of the Court, that the Jus-
tices decipher ambiguous signals about "evolving standards of decency" in such a way as to
support their substantive viewpoint. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 611 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253 It would be difficult to make this argument in the prison sentencing context, where
legislatures reign supreme.
254 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 68-69 (1980); Cover, supra note
222, at 1182; Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legis-
lation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1089, 1097-98 (2006);
Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: "Still in Search of a Uni-
fying Principle"?, 73 U. Prrr. L. REv. 107, 137 (2011); Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57
DUKE L.J. 1, 3 n.1 (2007) (citing scholarship).
255 The majoritarian Eighth Amendment doctrine may, in particular, fail to adequately pro-
tect minorities when punishment set by the political branches disproportionately impacts them.
See Cover, supra note 222, at 1171-82.
256 At least, the Supreme Court has interpreted objective indicators of evolving standards
of decency in such a way that those standards pointed in a direction that it was willing to follow.
257 It has also played a meaningful role in prison conditions litigation, see, e.g., Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994), and, more recently, sentencing juveniles to life without pa-
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Court has refused to put an end to a punishment practice that many
view to be inconsistent with human dignity2 8
III. TOWARD A SUPERMAJORITARIAN APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL LAW
Thus far I have argued that supermajoritarianism is central to the
constitutional regulation of and theoretical justification for the crimi-
nal justice system. I have then explained how, although the civic com-
munity has become more egalitarian since the founding, the
supermajoritarian features that once defined the criminal justice sys-
tem have given way to a primarily majoritarian or quasi-majoritarian
orientation. This shift has harmed the constitutional design and the
theoretical underpinnings of the criminal justice system. This next Sec-
tion considers new ways in which we may attempt to incorporate
supermajoritarian principles into the criminal justice system, with the
goal of infusing the criminal justice system with some of the virtues of
supermajoritarian community support.
A. Jury Restoration
The most obvious mechanism to restore supermajoritarian pro-
tections to our criminal law system is the one the Constitution guaran-
tees: the criminal jury. Douglas Berman, troubled by Paul Robinson's
conclusion that some criminal punishments are set at levels inconsis-
tent with community intuitions of justice, similarly suggests "giv[ing]
back to grand juries and petit juries the essential power and respect
the Framers wanted them to have" and thereby "restor[ing] an Ameri-
can tradition of having our criminal laws always informed by ... the
'principles by which the community actually makes judgments about
justice.' "259 This suggestion-with which I strongly agree in theory-is
difficult to implement in practice. By now, with a system of en-
trenched plea bargaining, a wholesale return to the jury in its tradi-
role, see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73
(2010).
258 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The basic concept underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."). Justice Breyer, dissenting
in Glossip v. Gross, noted that the decline in use of the death penalty in recent years "perhaps
reflect[s] the fact that a majority of Americans, when asked to choose between the death penalty
and life in prison without parole, now choose the latter." 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). More recent polls show support for the death penalty at the lowest point since 1972.
See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx [https://perma.cc/
AL8L-CKCZ].
259 Berman, supra note 14, at 1121.
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tional form is no easy matter. And the petit jury of today exists in a
weakened form which cannot be meaningfully expected to control the
excesses of punishment, over which it generally has no control or even
information.2 6 0
As a starting point, however, there are a number of ways in which
the jury could be reformed such that, at least in the small percentage
of cases in which a jury trial occurs, the jury has the opportunity to
serve as a meaningful supermajoritarian check. Scholars have pro-
posed certain reforms to the jury's power that would bring the institu-
tion closer in line with its historical analog, including instructing the
jury on the sentencing consequences of its verdict where feasible;261
restoring the jury's ability to decide questions of law, including the
constitutionality of punishment;262 and allowing instructions and argu-
ment on the power to nullify in certain circumstances.263 It would even
be possible to give defendants a right to jury sentencing.264
Various reforms to the jury selection process could also make the
jury more diverse and representative of the community, and therefore
more likely to serve as a genuine supermajoritarian institution. These
reforms may include restructuring265 or eliminating266 the exercise of
260 Modern juries generally cannot even hear the sentencing consequences of its decision.
See Kemmit, supra note 61, at 94-98.
261 See Gertner, supra note 144, at 937; Kemmitt, supra note 61, at 97.
262 See Chapman, supra note 25, at 195 (arguing in favor of the jury's "constitutional com-
petence," at least within limits); Cohen & Smith, supra note 60, at 124 (arguing for an end to
death qualification and a return to "what the Constitution guarantees: a jury trial wherein jurors
have the ability to determine whether a sentence of death is repugnant, if not to the jury as
citizens, then to the Constitution of the United States").
263 See Caisa Elizabeth Royer, Note, The Disobedient Jury: Why Lawmakers Should Codify
Jury Nullification, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1401 (2016) (arguing for codification of jury
nullification).
264 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 65 (arguing in favor of juror sentencing); lontcheva, supra
note 63, at 365-81 (detailing a proposal for jury sentencing); Barkow, supra note 63, at 107
(arguing for jury determinations of whether to apply mandatory minimum sentences).
265 In previous work, for example, I proposed replacing peremptory challenges with "'hy-
brid jury strikes'-challenges that lie between successful cause challenges and traditional per-
emptory strikes" and that would require "ex ante articulation of a race-neutral and meaningful
argument for exclusion." Cover, supra note 216, at 360. Others have suggested eliminating the
prosecutorial peremptory strike while preserving the practice for criminal defendants. E.g.,
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Per-
emptory Challenges, 31 Am. CRnn. L. REv. 1099, 1147-48 (1994); Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish
Peremptory Challenges by Prosecutors, 27 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1163, 1164-65 (2014).
266 Justice Marshall, concurring in Batson v. Kentucky, presaged that eliminating the per-
emptory challenge was the only way to rid the practice of racial discrimination. See 476 U.S. 79,
102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Others since have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g.,
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Judge Mark W. Bennett,
Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Domi-
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peremptory strikes, which are often used disproportionately to strike
minority venire members, narrowing or ending the practice of death
qualification in capital cases,267 restricting the use of hardship excep-
tions to jury service, and changing jury venire selection so that it does
not rely exclusively on voting rolls.2 68
If juries more accurately reflected the demographics and moral
viewpoints of the entire community, and if juries had the power to
enforce their common sense intuitions about justice in light of the
facts of a given case, jury trials might be more meaningful options for
criminal defendants and might offer genuine advantages over plea
bargaining. Today, when the evidence appears solid-or solid enough
for a jury to believe-that a defendant in fact committed the elements
of an offense, there is much to risk and little to gain from going to
trial, especially when the prosecutor is willing to offer a plea deal. Yet
if the jury had a normative role to play in deciding whether punish-
ment would be excessive in a particular case, then more defendants in
morally contested cases would likely stand on their right to a jury trial.
In this way, by restoring the jury's historical power, jury trials might
become more frequent, especially in situations where confirmation of
the community's standards would be most important.2 69 Precisely
those cases in which appropriate punishment is most disputed-and
thus the cases in which supermajoritarian review is most important-
would be the ones most likely to go to trial.
B. Supermajoritarian Legislative Processes
I described above how the shift to legislative rather than judge
made crimes had the unintended but pernicious consequences of in-
creasing both the volume and the politicization of the criminal law.27 0 I
nated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REv. 149, 167 (2010); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 809-10 (1997); Amar, supra note 41, at 1182-83.
267 See Cohen & Smith, supra note 60, at 124.
268 See Johnson, supra note 217, at 416.
269 By way of analogy, some have argued that one of the benefits of plea bargaining today
is that "easy" cases are resolved out of court and cases in which there is a genuine factual dispute
deserving of jury resolution may end up going to trial. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
752 (1970) ("[W]ith the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are con-
served for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which
there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof."). If the jury had a
meaningful role in deciding not just facts but also the appropriateness of punishment, then the
close cases with respect to community intuitions of justice would similarly be more likely to go to
trial.
270 See supra Section II.B.
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certainly do not advocate going back to a common law approach to
defining criminal laws, although some states continue to endorse the
practice alongside legislative codification.271 Yet the status quo is a
problematically majoritarian one. Moving to an ordinary legislative
system for enacting criminal laws did not adequately ensure that crim-
inal codes would reflect something close to community consensus.27 2
Because of the uniquely coercive effect of criminal legislation and the
distinct theoretical and constitutional imperatives in favor of
supermajoritarianism in this context, it would be appropriate to insti-
tute legislative reforms that are targeted specifically at criminal
lawmaking.273
One reform that could promote a degree of supermajoritarian
protection is a requirement that all legislation creating new crimes or
strengthening existing punishments must be passed by a supermajority
margin. The precise margin of victory required to pass criminal legis-
lation could be subject to debate, as it would involve a tradeoff be-
tween competing values: the greater the supermajority requirement,
the more community consensus, but the more difficult it would be to
pass new legislation.
The idea of supermajority voting rules for particular substantive
areas of legislation is not entirely new. In a different context, McGin-
nis and Rappaport have proposed supermajority rules for fiscal legis-
lation as normatively desirable and constitutionally sound,274 and, in
practice, various supermajority rules govern taxation and budgeting at
both the federal and state levels.275 Scholarly debate has emerged over
271 See McCabe, supra note 154, at 523 (noting that there are exceptions to the trend of
state courts declining to declare new or expand the scope of existing common law crimes); cf
Fletcher, supra note 156, at 23 (explaining that it is not clear whether punishment for common
law crimes is constitutional).
272 See supra Section II.B.
273 Cf supra note 168.
274 See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional
Solution, 40 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 365, 367 (1999); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483,
483-85 (1995); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the
Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Rules, 47 DuKE L.J. 327, 327-30 (1997).
275 Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution with Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 471, 479 (1999) (citing the "House of Representatives ... rule mandating a three-
fifths vote to pass a tax rate increase" and discussing other features of congressional budget
legislation that are supermajoritarian in practice); Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State
Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes, 14 AKRON TAX J. 43, 43-44 (1999) ("The states have
extensive experience with supermajority requirements for tax increases. Sixteen states have im-
posed supermajority requirements for tax hikes, caps on state revenue, or both.").
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the constitutionality of congressional supermajority voting rules,2 76
and the idea of supermajoritarian fiscal legislation has received
pushback.2 7 7 Yet the criminal law context mitigates the normative con-
cerns that have been expressed. In particular, fiscal supermajoritarian-
ism hamstrings government functioning when broad consensus cannot
be reached; hurdles to ratcheting up criminal punishment, by contrast,
do not limit government from exercising its core responsibilities, but
only prevent government from increasing punishment without a broad
support base.
Supermajority voting rules would not, of course, ensure that legis-
lation is a perfect reflection of supermajority public sentiment. As
noted earlier, a number of factors create disconnects between legisla-
tive policy and public opinion, and not all of them would be cured by a
supermajority rule. In particular, the public pressures on legislators to
be tough on crime in the abstract, the pathologies of gerrymandering,
and the distorting effects of money in politics mean that supermajority
voting rules for legislation would not necessarily be a complete fix. 278
The numerical margin of a supermajority voting rule would not affect
the political processes, incentives, and disconnects underpinning the
legislative system. For instance, it is not clear that a supermajority re-
quirement in the legislature would have prevented the rise of mass
incarceration and the war on drugs; indeed, some harsh crime bills
passed with overwhelming bipartisan support.2 7 9 At the same time, a
supermajority rule for new and enhanced punishment would at least
require some measure of bipartisan support and hence have a greater
chance of representing across-the-board community agreement-and
could make a meaningful difference.2so It would also make it difficult
276 E.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting
Rules, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2012); Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Ging-
rich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995) (signed by 17 law professors).
277 See e.g., Michael Leachman et al., Six Reasons Why Supermajority Requirements to
Raise Taxes Are a Bad Idea, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 14, 2012), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-13-12sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX3T-33V6].
278 See supra note 10.
279 See supra note 164.
280 Note that the controversial Clinton-era Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act,
which included a harsh federal three-strikes law, passed by a margin of 235-195 in the House
and 61-38 in the Senate. See H.R. 3355 RECORDED VoTE, FINAL VoTE RESULTS FOR ROLL
CALL (Aug. 21, 1994), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1994/roll416.xml [https://perma.cc/JLU9-4P8V];
H.R. 3355, VOTE SUMMARY, VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT Acr OF 1994,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call ists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?congress=103&ses
sion=2&vote=00295 [https://perma.cc/QW73-GHQA]. While the law received substantial bipar-
tisan support, it would not have passed with a stronger supermajoritarian requirement.
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to slip criminal legislation into spending or budgetary bills, to be
passed unthinkingly by a legislature prioritizing other issues.
Another mechanism that may increase the likelihood of
supermajoritarian support for criminal legislation is, as suggested by
Richard Myers II, a mandatory sunset clause for criminal laws.281 My-
ers suggests this reform to solve the significant problem of a time lag
between contemporary community values and outdated yet still bind-
ing criminal legislation-a gap caused at least in part by political pres-
sures which make decriminalization difficult and lead to a one-way
ratchet toward increased punishment.2 8 2 Myers's proposed reform
would additionally bolster the supermajoritarian bona fides of the
criminal law. Criminal laws stay in place unless a legislative majority
cares enough to mobilize and overturn them. This system does not
ensure supermajoritarian support for the full range of laws on the
books today.
C. Supermajoritarian Citizen Review
Because both the modern jury and the modern legislature face
structural impediments to serving as a true supermajoritarian check
on criminal punishment, we should also consider implementing new
mechanisms for supermajoritarian citizen input on criminal justice
policy.
A rich scholarship has emerged advocating for increased citizen
engagement with the criminal justice system. Stephanos Bibas has
proposed increasing citizen participation in the criminal justice system
to improve democratic accountability and to counteract the "insider"
bureaucratic dynamics of modern criminal justice? -8 Jocelyn Simon-
son has shed light on the opportunities and need for bottom-up civic
participation through contestation and grassroots action.284 Laura Ap-
pleman has suggested weaving citizen voices into every stage of the
criminal justice process,2 8 5 including through "plea juries"286 and juries
281 Myers, supra note 7 ("Many of these problems and concerns share a common source:
the intransigence of criminal law. Once on the books, criminal law is difficult to repeal. It stays
with us, despite changing moral convictions and majority preferences. The intransigence, in turn,
pressures other parts of the system.").
282 See id.
283 Bibas, supra note 16, at 1692.
284 Simonson, supra note 182 (manuscript at 40-41); Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing
Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 1609, 1612-13 (2017).
285 Appleman, supra note 5, at 1422-24.
286 Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 733, 758 (2010).
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at bail setting.287 Josh Bowers has argued for "normative juries" at
different stages of criminal proceedings where moral rather than tech-
nical legal determinations are more appropriate, such as at charging,
bail-setting, and sentencing.a8 Rachel Barkow has advocated for ju-
ries to decide whether to apply mandatory minimums.28 9
Below, I contribute three ideas to the mix in an attempt to for-
malize supermajoritarian citizen review of criminal law at three stages:
at the abstract, legislative level, at the front end of the criminal justice
system when the coercive power of the state is introduced, and at the
back end, when punishment is applied. My goal in sketching out these
three proposals, and in referencing above the thoughtful ideas that
others have put forth, is not to pinpoint any one specific reform pro-
posal as a magic bullet, or to present a detailed policy plan. Rather, I
have two primary objectives. First, I hope to highlight the many ways
in which the criminal justice system might be infused with new
supermajoritarian protections, at a variety of different moments and
through a variety of innovative forms. Second, I hope to place a gloss
on the ideas of scholars ahead of me, by emphasizing that efforts to
democratize the criminal justice system should have a goal beyond
encouraging civic participation. Ideally, reform measures should strive
to achieve supermajoritarian support for, not merely public engage-
ment with, the criminal justice system. By overtly recognizing the
structural imperative of supermajoritarian criminal justice, we dis-
cover a helpful frame for evaluating and, perhaps, enhancing existing
reform proposals. For example, through the lens of supermajoritarian-
ism, suggestions to increase jury participation throughout the criminal
justice process are particularly appealing, as they would promote
unanimous-not merely majoritarian-support for criminal justice
outcomes. Other ideas for civic engagement could be strengthened by
infusing a supermajoritarian ideal.
My first proposal is to convene a "legislative jury" of approxi-
mately 50 people on a periodic basis to review the jurisdiction's crimi-
nal legislation, including statutorily authorized punishment for the
crimes. Selection for this "legislative jury" would be similar to selec-
tion for and service on a grand jury. Because the review would entail
significant time and resources, it should take place only every 20 years
or so. The review would include a public notice-and-comment period
287 Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1364-65 (2012).
288 Bowers, supra note 8, at 1659-60.
289 Barkow, supra note 63, at 107.
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during which criminal justice stakeholders could offer their perspec-
tives on particular laws which need reform. If a supermajority of the
"legislative jury" supported the existing legislation by supermajority
vote, no further action would be needed. However, if
supermajoritarian consensus could not be achieved as to the accepta-
bility of particular laws, the "legislative jury" would have the authority
to issue an advisory "verdict," directing the legislature to review and
consider amending them.
My second proposal is to foster supermajoritarian input into the
criminal justice system at the front end. One can imagine a variety of
shapes that supermajoritarian citizen review could take in such diverse
areas as coercive police tactics and prosecutorial discretion. I will con-
sider one: a requirement that, before a prosecutor makes a particu-
larly serious charging decision, such as the decision to pursue the
death penalty or to seek a particularly onerous sentencing enhance-
ment, she would need to secure supermajoritarian authorization from
a body representative of the community-a similar, yet stronger, insti-
tution than Josh Bowers's proposed normative grand juries.290
My third proposal, targeting the back end of the criminal justice
process, is to periodically-perhaps annually-empanel a "criminal
outcomes jury," which would be tasked with reviewing a randomized
sample of cases that were actually adjudicated and resulted in a guilty
plea or a jury verdict of guilt. This "criminal outcomes jury" would not
have any power to overturn the criminal convictions or reduce
sentences, but would rather review the records of the cases, with the
assistance of one or more prosecutors and defense attorneys, and de-
liberate upon whether the results were "just" or "unjust." The jury
would submit a report on its findings both to the legislature and to the
courts, prosecutors, and defense bar. The report could be used to jus-
tify or catalyze legislative change and could also be used to evaluate
prosecutorial practices and to advocate for particular sentences in fu-
ture cases. The "criminal outcomes jury" could serve some of the pur-
poses of dialogue between the people and legislature traditionally
served by juries.29 1
290 See also Bibas, supra note 16, at 1692 ("Revived grand juries, or plea juries, could play
more meaningful roles in the most serious criminal cases. These juries could check prosecutorial
charging and bargaining decisions, especially the (ab)use of mandatory minimum penalties.").
See generally Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Nornative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 319 (2012) (proposing an equitable, or normative, role for grand juries in determining
whether a given case-particularly a public-order case-should be prosecuted).
291 See Kemrnitt, supra note 61, at 108 ("By refusing to convict defendants of crimes with
punishments deemed isproportionate by current standards of decency, juries can engage legisla-
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These ideas are illustrative examples, designed to begin a discus-
sion about how we might promote supermajoritarian citizen interven-
tion in a world in which reforming the traditional jury and the
majoritarian legislative process may not be enough.
D. Supermajoritarian Eighth Amendment Scrutiny
Finally, Supreme Court doctrine could evolve in ways that might
account for the loss of other constitutional supermajoritarian protec-
tions. As discussed above, the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine
has developed in a distinctly majoritarian direction. A new doctrinal
trajectory could do much to enforce the supermajoritarian constitu-
tional principle that has been weakened by the decline of the jury
trial.
I am by no means the only critic to voice concerns about the
majoritarian doctrinal approach that the Court takes to the Eighth
Amendment.292 Some of these critics have advocated a more explicitly
independent and thus countermajoritarian approach to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.293 These commentators, however, run up
against a competing critique of the Eighth Amendment doctrine: that
of judicial overreaching and subjectivity. Despite the concerns about
majoritarian influence over Eighth Amendment doctrine, one of the
compelling reasons for maintaining the "evolving standards of de-
cency" inquiry is that, untethered from any "objective indicators" of
society's viewpoints on permissible punishment, the content of the
Eighth Amendment would be determined by the whims of five of nine
men and women in black robes who lack democratic accountability.294
Indeed, some critics of the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine
contend that this subjectivity already exists, because the "objective in-
dicia" inquiry creates a veneer, rather than the reality, of a
majoritarian constraint. "Objective indicia," critics argue, are fuzzy
tures in a dialogue in which both institutions work toward a system of punishment that is morally
palatable to the population at large.").
292 See supra note 254.
293 E.g., Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
853, 903-05 (2013); Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 403, 424-29 (2011).
294 Justice Scalia vehemently decried what he perceived as doctrinal subjectivity. E.g., At-
kins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348-49 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 611 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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signals subject to genuinely differing interpretations295 as well as to
ends-oriented machinations296 by members of the Court.297
These two contrasting critiques-one of undue deference to
majoritarian norms and one of undue subjectivity-create a great
Eighth Amendment dilemma: a choice between a majoritarian ap-
proach that dilutes the protection of an individual right against major-
ity tyranny and an independent judicial inquiry that threatens to
impose subjective value judgments of unelected judges upon the
people.
When we focus on a supermajoritarian approach to criminal law,
however, there may be a way out of this dilemma. The Eighth Amend-
ment, like other individual rights, should check the will of the major-
ity. Yet the Eighth Amendment, which is tied by text and long-
standing doctrine to contemporary standards of morality, should not
solely reflect the idiosyncratic moral perspectives of five Justices. If we
heed the concerns posed by punishment in the face of moral dissensus
and if we focus on the supermajoritarian solution, Eighth Amendment
doctrine could achieve both the goals of a countermajoritarian check
upon governmental excess and of judicial objectivity.
At present, when the Court analyzes the constitutionality of a
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it first asks whether soci-
ety has reached a majority consensus against a particular punishment,
and it then brings its "independent judgment" to bear to decide
whether the punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.2 9 8 The first
step is both objective (its strength) and majoritarian (its weakness).
Objectivity and majoritarianism have always been seen to go
hand in hand. Yet there is no particular reason why they must. At step
one, instead, the Court could ask whether a substantial portion of the
295 Sigler, supra note 293, at 410-11.
296 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
297 Corinna Barrett Lain in Deciding Death argues with nuance for a third alternative: that
the "evolving standards of decency" inquiry is both majoritarian as a doctrine and a charade, but
that the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is nonetheless tethered to majoritarian preferences
through nondoctrinal means. The real majoritarian influence on the Court comes from extrajudi-
cial majoritarian influences that pervade its decisionmaking not only in the death penalty and
Eighth Amendment contexts, but throughout its constitutional jurisprudence. See Lain, supra
note 254, at 35-43.
298 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 ("The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the
question. These data give us essential instruction. We then must determine, in the exercise of our
own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for
juveniles.").
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community considers a particular punishment o be "cruel and unu-
sual" and it could then go on to exercise its own judgment to decide
whether the punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. In other
words, there would be an expectation that a constitutional punishment
would have supermajoritarian support; a punishment that did not have
this kind of consensus support would be constitutionally suspect. In
this way, the "objective indicia" of "evolving standards of decency"
would be responsive to countermajoritarian forces, rather than
majoritarian forces-yet it would still maintain a degree of objectivity.
If the Court deems a punishment cruel and unusual when exercising
its independent judgment, and that independent judgment is corrobo-
rated by the strongly held moral viewpoints of a substantial minority
of the community, it could strike down a punishment in a manner that
is both countermajoritarian and objective. In this way, objectivity need
not be majoritarian.
In conducting this analysis, the Court should reference something
other than mere popular disagreement with a criminal law or criminal
punishment. There are countless reasons for people to oppose particu-
lar criminal laws: they may believe prisons are overcrowded, courts
overwhelmed, or government underfunded; they may believe that
similar legislative objectives could be achieved more efficiently
through means other than criminalization. These are not reasons to
find a particular offense or penalty unconstitutional. Rather, the
Court should inquire whether a substantial minority considers impos-
ing punishment for a particular type of offense or at a particular de-
gree of severity to be grossly excessive, inhumane, or immoral-to
violate the dignity of man. In the face of this type of substantial mi-
nority sentiment, paired with the independent judgment of the major-
ity of the Court, the Court should conclude that the punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment.
The insight here is not that the minority sense of morality should
frustrate the will of the majority. It is, rather, that in the unusual case
of criminal punishment, in which the coercive power of the state is
being brought to bear upon individual citizens, the strong moral con-
demnation of a substantial minority of the community is an important
indicator that moderation is needed, and when paired with the Court's
independent judgment, this condemnation justifies the exercise of the





Through the jury trial guarantee, the Constitution creates a
supermajoritarian framework for imposing criminal punishment.
Criminal law theorists implicitly depend upon that same
supermajoritarian ideal when they justify criminal punishment as the
expression of the community's moral condemnation or as the enforce-
ment of community norms. With the virtual disappearance of the jury,
the opacity of punishment, and the politicization of crime, however,
existing supermajoritarian checks have lost their teeth. The Supreme
Court, meanwhile, has acquiesced in a majoritarian vision of criminal
justice. The resulting majoritarian status quo has done harm both to
the intended constitutional structure and to the legitimacy of
punishment.
This harm, however, need not be irrevocable. There are multiple
opportunities at various stages of the criminal justice system to intro-
duce new supermajoritarian checks and restore old ones. These initia-
tives might include jury reform, supermajority voting rules for crime
legislation, robust supermajoritarian citizen review of criminal
processes, from criminalization to enforcement to imposition of pun-
ishment, and development of judicial doctrines responsive to the need
for supermajoritarian support. With these and other reform efforts,
we might live up to the ideal that criminal punishment should be im-
posed only under those circumstances in which the community
broadly agrees that it is morally defensible to do so.
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